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ABSTRACT 
Police officers working in countries plagued by drug trafficking are often offered 
a choice between “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”).  Given this option, it is not 
surprising that levels of police corruption are high in these nation-states.  Significantly, 
however, levels of police corruption do differ radically between those countries where the 
levels of drug production and trafficking are similar.  This thesis examines the case of 
Mexico, where corruption has been historically high and has increased in recent times; 
and the case of Colombia, where levels of police corruption have been relatively low and 
might even be said to be on the decline.  Specialists in police reform and anti-corruption 
typically look at administrative factors such as ethics, salary levels, the purging of corrupt 
officials, and the recruiting and training of “clean” officers as essential elements in the 
prevention of police corruption.  While these factors explain some of the differences in 
levels of corruption, this thesis fills an important gap in the existing literature by moving 
beyond these conventional explanations.  In particular, it introduces a country-specific 
approach to drug-related police corruption, including factors such as the organizational 
structure of the police force (centralized or decentralized), the legacy of the “political 
criminal nexus” in the country concerned, and both the size and “ideology” of the drug 
trafficking organizations involved.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................4 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY....................................5 
C. SOURCES AND THESIS ORGANIZATION ............................................11 
II. DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION IN MEXICO .................................15 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 
B. MEXICAN POLICE CORRUPTION DURING PRI HEGEMONY.......19 
C. MEXICAN POLICE CORRUPTION FROM 2000-TO-PRESENT ........26 
D PUBLIC TRUST IN THE MEXICAN POLICE ........................................32 
E. MEXICAN POLICE REFORM EFFORTS ...............................................37 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................40 
III. DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION IN COLOMBIA ...........................43 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................43 
B. THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE—AS A SOURCE AND 
TARGET OF VIOLENCE............................................................................46 
C. UNHOLY ALLIANCE: THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE 
AND LOS PEPES ...........................................................................................50 
D. COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE OFFICERS ON THE CARTEL 
PAYROLL (1980-1994) .................................................................................55 
E. REFORMING THE CNP: THE 1991, 1993 AND 1995 POLICE 
REFORM EFFORTS ....................................................................................60 
F. CURRENT LEVELS OF POLICE CORRUPTION, 1995 TO 2008........65 
G. WINNING PUBLIC TRUST: THE CHANGING PERCEPTION OF 
THE CNP........................................................................................................68 
H. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................73 
IV. EXPLAINING POLICE CORRUPTION ...............................................................75 
A INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................75 
B. POLICE SUBCULTURE AND THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL 
NEXUS (PCN) ................................................................................................76 
C ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA.........77 
1. The Police Recruitment Process in Mexico .....................................77 
2. The Police Recruitment Process in Colombia .................................79 
3 Police Salaries, Resources, Promotion and Training in Mexico....80 
4 Police Salaries, Resources, Promotion and Training in 
Colombia.............................................................................................85 
5.  U.S. Military and Police Aid to Mexico and Colombia ..................89 
D. COLOMBIA’S SUCCESS AND MEXICO’S FAILURE AT 
REFORMING THE POLICE ......................................................................92 
E. CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED POLICE SYSTEMS ...92 
F. CARTEL SIZE AND IDEOLOGY ..............................................................99 
 viii
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................103 
A. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................103 
B. COMPARING CORRUPTION IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA.........103 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BOTH POLICING SYSTEMS..............109 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................111 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................123 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Average Monthly Cartel-related Slayings in Mexico, 2007-2008. (From 
Donnelley March 2008). ....................................................................................1 
Figure 2. Top-Down System of Control (From: Perez, 2007). .......................................19 
Figure 3. Informal Taxation System placed on drug traffickers, 1980s-to-mid-1990s. 
(From Pimentel, 2000) .....................................................................................20 
Figure 4. Major drug corridors correlated with known Mexican drug plazas.  (From 
STRATFOR, 2007)..........................................................................................22 
Figure 5. Multi-Directional Model of Police Corruption (2000-to-Present)-(From 
Perez, 2005) .....................................................................................................26 
Figure 6. Nuevo Laredo Municipal Police arriving at PFP Headquarters in Mexico 
City. They were arrested for passing sensitive intelligence on police 
operations to the Gulf Cartel. (From Corn, 2008). ..........................................30 
Figure 7. The Zetas captured by AFI agents and turned over to the Sinaloa Cartel. 
(From Freeman, 2006). ....................................................................................31 
Figure 8. Ranking of incidence of corruption by institution on a scale of 0-10 (10 
being high level of corruption)-2004. (From Morris, 2004)............................32 
Figure 9. Mexican Cartel Areas of Influence. (From Congressional Reporting 
Service Report, October 16, 2007). .................................................................36 
Figure 10. Rate of cartel-related slayings in Mexico, January-February 2008 (From 
Donnelly, 2008). ..............................................................................................37 
Figure 11. Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) building in Bogota in 
1989 after one of Pablo Escobar’s bombs went off.  DAS is equivalent to 
the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. (From Bowden, 2001).....46 
Figure 12. Multi-Directional Model of institutional corruption, 1980s-to-1990s.  
(From Chespesiuk, 1999).................................................................................56 
Figure 13. Members of Colonel Martinez's Bloque de Busqueda celebrate over Pablo 
Escobar's body on December 2, 1993, in a photograph taken by DEA 
agent Steve Murphy. Pablo's death ended a fifteen-month effort that cost 
hundreds of millions of dollars. It effectively eliminated the Medellin 
Cartel. (From: Bowden, 2001) .........................................................................59 
Figure 14. Trust in Institution that Protect Rights in Colombia. (From: Raga, 2006). .....70 
Figure 15. Victimization: Police Officers Demanding Bribes in Comparative 
Perspective. (From: Raga, 2006). ....................................................................71 
Figure 16. Human Rights Violations and other forms of corruption are perceived by 
the CNP as larger problems than drug-related corruption. (From Urena, 
2006). ...............................................................................................................72 
Figure 17. Diario Oficial de la Federación--Amounts are in billions of Mexican peso.  
(Artz, 2001)......................................................................................................81 
Figure 18. Average Salary for CNP officers of various ranks.  Amounts are in $USD. 
Minimum wage for 2007 was set at USD $220 by Colombian 
Government.  (From Gutiérrez, 2008) .............................................................86 
 x
Figure 19. U.S Military and Police Aid to Mexico—all millions are in U.S dollars. 
(From WOLA, 2006). ......................................................................................90 
Figure 20. US Military and Police Aid to Colombia in millions (From WOLA, 2006) ...91 
Figure 21. Federal police and current chain of command.  (From Reames and 
Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007). ........................................94 
Figure 22. Mexico City (DF) Federal police and current chain of command.  (From 
Reames and Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007).....................95 
Figure 23. State Police and current chain of command.  (From Reames and 
Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007). ........................................96 
Figure 24. Municipal Police and current chain of command.  (From Reames and 
Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007). ........................................97 
Figure 25. Colombian National Police and current chain of command. (From Policía 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Corruption in the Mexico City Police Force--2004  Key: L=low; 
M=Medium; H=High; UK=Unknown. Although a distinction between 
local and federal police is important, this  report was unable to identify 
which police were involved in different forms of corruption. (From 
Anozie et al., 2004)..........................................................................................33 
Table 2. Distribution of Human Rights violations committed by the CNP and 
Military in 1991. (From Call, 1993). ...............................................................49 
Table 3. Table 2: Distribution of Human Rights violations committed by the CNP 
and Military based on 229 excerpted newspapers articles from 2005-2007, 
in which events dating back to 1997 were mentioned. ....................................67 
Table 4. Military and Police Collaboration with Illegal groups (Author’s 
calculation based on articles summarized in Colombian Support Network, 
2007) ................................................................................................................67 
Table 5. Daily Income by Sector (average daily wage in 2005 was USD$ 4.05). 
(Cornelius 2005). .............................................................................................82 
Table 6. Summary of factors accounting for different levels of drug-related police 
corruption within the Mexican and Colombian Police Forces.......................106 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
AFI  Agencia Federal de Investigaciones/Federal Investigative Police 
CENDRO Centro de Planeación para el Control de Drogas/National Drug 
Control Center 
CISEN Centro de Información y Seguridad Nacional/National Information 
and Security System 
CGSB Simón Bolívar National Guerrilla Coordination Committee 
CNP  Colombian National Police 
DEA  Drug Enforcement Administration 
D.F.   Distrito Federal/Federal District (Mexico City) 
DAS Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad 
DFS Dirección Federal de Seguridad/Federal Security Directorate 
DIFIN Plain Cloth Investigation Police Corp-DAS 
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
GAFE Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
INCD Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas/National Institute 
to Combat Drugs 
INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program 
Los Pepes Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar/People Persecuted by Pablo 
Escobar 
M-19   March 19 Revolutionary Group 
PAN Partido Accion Nacional/National Action Party 
PCN Political Criminal Nexus 
PFP Policía Federal Preventiva/Federal Preventative Police 
PGJDF Procuraduría General de Justicia del Distrito Federal/Office of 
the Attorney General of the Federal District 
PGJE Procuraduría General de Justicia del Estado/State Attorney 
General’s Office 
PGR Procuraduría General de la República/Office of the Attorney 
General 
PJF Policía Judicial Federal/Federal Judicial Police 
 xiv
PRD Partido de la Revolución Democrática/Party of the Democratic 
Revolution 
SEDENA Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional/National Defense Ministry 
SIEDO Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia 
Organizada/Office of the Deputy Attorney for Special 
Investigation of Organized Crime 
SM Secretaria de Marina/Mexican Navy 
SSP Secretaria de Seguridad Publica/Ministry of Public Security 
$USD United States Dollar 
WOLA Washington Office of Latin American Affairs 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I thank God for the opportunity to have been able to attend the 
Naval Postgraduate School, an experience which has allowed me to dramatically expand 
my knowledge on Latin America.  Second, I want to thank my wife, Navonia LaTrese, 
whose patience and understanding ensured that I had the time and opportunity to 
complete this thesis.  Third, I thank my three sons, Charles, Luis Virgil and Myles Luis, 
who continued to be a consistent reminder that even though being at the Naval 
Postgraduate School was often challenging, it was still shore duty. 
I also want to thank my thesis advisors, Professor Jeanne Giraldo and Professor 
Marcos Berger.  Their steady guidance and advice allowed me not only to learn about and 
clarify the tangible differences in police corruption in Mexico and Colombia, but also 
helped me to produce a thesis in which I can take considerable pride.  Hopefully, it will 
encourage academic researchers and government policy makers alike to broaden their 
understanding of past policy successes and failures in Mexico and Colombia and 
influence the study and practice of policy in the future. 
 xvi




A crooked cop is the oldest story in the book, nowhere more so than in Mexico 
and Colombia.  However, the degree of corruption in Mexico is much worse today than 
in the past, and it was bad in the past, while police corruption appears to be on the decline 
in Colombia.  Thus, although it has been a perennial problem, police corruption, 
especially drug-related police corruption in Mexico has assumed a new level of 
importance at the same time as drug-related violence has never been higher.  In 2005, 
there were more than 600 drug-related murders in six Mexican states, all of which are 
located along the U.S.-Mexican border.  Meanwhile, between 2007 and 2008, drug 
related killings averaged about two hundred a month in the country as a whole.1 
 
 
Figure 1.    Average Monthly Cartel-related Slayings in Mexico, 2007-2008. (From 
Donnelley March 2008). 
Mexico’s northern states have experienced the highest levels of drug-related 
violence because drug traffickers are fighting for control over the lucrative drug routes 
into the United States.  Lawlessness has become so rampant and impunity so complete, 
                                                 
1 Robert Donnelly, News Report March 2008 (University of San Diego: Trans-Border Institute, March 
2008).  
 2
that experts on the illegal drug trade have begun comparing northern Mexico to the 
situation in Colombia a couple of decades ago.  Superficially there are certainly 
similarities.  But, as this thesis will make clear the similarities between drug-related 
police corruption and drug-related violence in Mexico on the one hand and Colombia on 
the other hand are much less pronounced than the differences.  To put it colloquially, 
Mexico is the manzana (apple) and Colombia is the naranja (orange).  Prior to his death 
in December 1993, Pablo Escobar (head of the Medellin Cartel) conducted violent, full-
scale assaults on both the state and his main rival, the Cali Cartel.  In Colombia in the 
1980s, powerful drug cartels effectively took over large parts of the country by 
corrupting, politicians, judges, journalists, and to some degree police officers -- 
effectively co-opting the “state” itself.  In the early 1990s, however, assassination and 
retaliatory violence increasingly displaced corruption in terms of the interaction between 
the Medellin Cartel, and to a lesser extent the Cali Cartel, and the “state”.  In Mexico, 
meanwhile, long before the recent upsurge in violence, in fact even before the Mexican 
Cartels displaced the Colombian Cartels as the dominant force in the drug trade in the 
Americas, police corruption was already endemic.  In Mexico, this included the low-level 
bribery of police officers to avoid prosecution in relation to a range of minor crimes 
(from exceeding the speed limit to driving under the influence of alcohol) at one end of 
the spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum, the police are increasingly and actively 
assisting the drug cartels in Mexico at virtually every level of their operations. 
According to most experts, very few, if any police officers along the U.S-Mexican 
Border are not involved in drug-related corruption.2  President Vicente Fox in 2005 was 
forced to send over 1,000 soldiers and federal police agents to patrol Nuevo Laredo and 
other border cities as part of a special operation called Operativo Mexico Seguro 
(Operation Safe Mexico).  This operation was set in motion after a gun battle broke out 
between federal and municipal police officers during a federal investigation of drug-
related corruption.  The incident resulted in the shooting death of two police chiefs and 
the president of the local chamber of commerce.  As a result of the investigation Nuevo 
                                                 
2 Tomas Bravo, "Police Corruption Undermines Mexico's War on Drugs," Boston Globe, April 17, 
2007, http://members.boston.com/reg/login.do (accessed August 23, 2007).  
 3
Laredo’s mayor suspended 730 municipal police officers.  All 730 officers were forced to 
take polygraph tests, the results of which indicated that over half of them were receiving 
payments from the Gulf Cartel.3  Gun battles between municipal police, federal police, 
and the military are not uncommon in Mexico, where some, and sometimes virtually all 
members of the various police departments, are on the payroll of the drug cartels.  In 
Colombia, as we will see in Chapter III, such events are much less common.  In 2004 and 
2005, however, two incidents made headlines; units of the Colombian National Police 
were massacred by Army units that were providing security for one or more of the 
numerous Colombian drug cartelitos that took over after the demise of the Medellin and 
Cali Cartels in the mid-1990s. 
The conventional wisdom is that wherever there is drug trafficking there is police 
corruption and little can be done to combat it.  Improved wages and greater attention to 
ethics can never compete with the choice between “plata o plomo” (“silver or lead”) 
offered to the police by drug traffickers.  While there is much truth to this, there is a great 
deal of variation in both the form and level of corruption amongst counter-drug police 
agencies in different countries where drug trafficking is a more or less equally important 
part of the overall political economy.  In particular, this thesis demonstrates that levels of 
police corruption generally (and drug-related corruption specifically) are much higher in 
Mexico than in Colombia — a fact that has both virtually always been the case and has 
also almost always been overlooked in the literature on police corruption and drug-
trafficking. 
Specialists in police reform and anti-corruption typically look at administrative 
factors such as ethics, salary levels, the purging of corrupt officials, and the recruiting 
and training of “clean” officers as essential elements in the prevention of police 
corruption.  While these factors do explain some of the differences in levels of police 
corruption in Colombia and Mexico, this thesis fills an important gap in the existing 
literature by moving beyond these conventional explanations.  In particular, it introduces 
                                                 
3 Ginger Thomas, "Corruption Hampers Mexican Police in Border Drug War," New York Times, July 
5, 2005 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/international/americas/05mexico.html?ex=1278216000&en=317cb5e
1316d6c70&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=all (accessed September 9, 2007).  
 4
a country-specific approach to drug-related police corruption, including factors such as 
the organizational structure of the police force (centralized or decentralized), the legacy 
of the “political criminal nexus” in the country concerned, and both the size and 
“ideology” of the drug trafficking organizations involved.  
A. IMPORTANCE 
Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers are responsible for the production and 
transportation of the vast majority of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine that enters 
the United States today.  Ninety percent of all street cocaine enters the United States 
through the porous two thousand-mile border with Mexico.  At the present time, the 
international drug trade as a whole is thought to earn its operators a profit of three 
hundred to five hundred billion dollars a year.  Back in 1994, the earnings of the 
Colombia-based Cali Cartel were estimated to be thirty billion dollars for that year alone; 
more recently, the Gulf Cartel in Mexico is thought to make between ten and twenty 
billion dollars a year.4  The drug trade’s ability to corrupt police officers and public 
officials generally continues to threaten democratic governability and public security in 
both Mexico and Colombia.5  However, the effects are not only felt in Mexico and 
Colombia: U.S. law enforcement and judiciary personnel are also subject to drug-related 
corruption.  In Tucson, Arizona, Mexican drug lords paid huge bribes to U.S. border 
inspectors to help smuggle an estimated 20 tons of cocaine into Arizona.  This particular 
operation was shut down on February 3, 2007 by federal investigators.6  Since 2004, 
more than 200 U.S. law enforcement and judiciary personnel have been charged with 
drug-related corruption directly linked to Mexican drug cartels.7 
                                                 
4 Ron Chepesiuk, The War on Drugs: An International Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, California: Abc-
Clio, 1999), 191.  
5  Ibid., xix. 
6 Jerome R. Corsi, "WorldNet Daily: Border-Agent Investigator had Tie to Smuggler," World Net 
Daily, February 09, 2007. http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=54166 (accessed 
August 28, 2007).  
7 Ralph Vartabedian, Richard A. Serrano and Richard Marosi, "Rise in Bribery Tests Integrity," Los 
Angeles Times, October 23, 2006. http://www.sheldensays.com/rise_in_bribery_tests_integrity.htm 
(accessed November 26, 2007). 
 5
Clearly, the narcotics trade, because of its huge profits and destabilizing power, is 
one of the central factors generating violence in Colombia, Mexico and to some degree in 
the United States as well.  In order to formulate strategies for mitigating or eliminating 
drug-related police corruption all three governments must focus significant attention on 
the problem and work on developing trans-national relationships.  To do this, it is 
important to understand both the failures and strengths of each country in order to rectify 
their respective deficiencies in relation to law enforcement.  Significantly, Colombia is 
doing a much better job controlling police corruption despite the fact that the cultivation, 
production and the initial stages of transportation takes place there.  It is important to 
understand the Colombian and Mexican policing and anti-drug trafficking systems in 
terms of both their successes and failures.  Lessons learned can lead to a more effective 
police system for both countries. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
For as long as there have been formal police forces, there has been police 
corruption.  And, for as long as there have been social theorists, there have been theories 
of police corruption.8  The literature on police corruption mainly addresses the cultural, 
organizational and economic factors behind the phenomenon.  Theorists have focused on 
these key variables for most of the nineteenth and twentieth century and they are still at 
the center of virtually all reform efforts today.  However the now conventional 
explanations cannot fully explain the important differences in the degree of drug-related 
police corruption in Mexico and Colombia, both of which are leading centers for the 
production and transportation of illegal drugs.  To better comprehend police corruption 
both conventional and country-specific explanations will be used in an integrated fashion 
that explains the differences in drug-related police corruption in Mexico on the one hand 
and Colombia on the other hand. 
Both general and drug-related police corruption in Mexico are much higher than 
in Colombia.  Despite the need to know the exact nature and extent of police corruption, 
                                                 
8 Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Corruption; a Sociological Perspective, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Anchor Press, 1974), 1. 
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the measurement of police corruption—or, for that matter, any other type of corruption—
is surprisingly underdeveloped.  Defined as the use of public office for private gain, 
corruption can take many forms.  Unlike for most other crimes, official data on 
corruption rates is very hard to obtain; however there are several sources and various 
methods that can be used to estimate the extent of police corruption.  These range from 
surveys of the general public and police officers, to sociological field studies, as well as 
independent commissions, case studies, books and periodicals, and reporting and 
interviews/correspondences with country specific experts on police corruption.9  An 
example of this type of measurement for Mexico is illustrated by Police Forces in 
Mexico: A Profile, which reported in 2002 that the median Mexican household spends 8 
percent of its income on bribes (mordidas or “bites”) paid to the police.  An additional 
survey in the same report indicated that 90 percent of respondents in Mexico City had 
“little” or “no” trust in the police.10 
By contrast, the public perception of the Colombian National Police (CNP) today 
is highly favorable.  A 2007 article, enthusiastically entitled “The people’s police: why 
the residents of Bogotá have come to love their police force, after years of suspicion and 
resentment”, indicated that 86.3 percent of the population surveyed thought that “the 
community policing program had addressed their needs and complaints”. Meanwhile, 99 
percent of those interviewed insisted that the “community police were friendly toward the 
public” and 86.5 percent thought that there had been an improvement in “police 
performance.”11 
A survey of Colombian National police officers conducted in 1998 reported that 
drug-related corruption was one of the three least serious areas of corruption facing the 
CNP.12  However this is not the case for Mexico.  In 1995, the Mexican Attorney 
                                                 
9 Ivkovic S. Kutnjak, Fallen Blue Knights: Controlling Police Corruption (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 33-35.  
10 Benjamin N. Reames, "Police Forces in Mexico: A Profile" (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S. Mexican 
Studies, May 2003). 
11 Charo Quesada, "The People’s Police," Inter-American Development Bank, 
http://www.iadb.org/idbamerica/index.cfm?thisid=2817 (accessed September 10, 2007).  
12 Nubia Uruena, "Police Corruption in Colombia" In The Uncertainty Series, eds. Stanley Einstein 
and Menachem Amir, Vol. 4.1 (Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice, 2003), 574.  
 7
General’s Office, Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), reported that upwards of 
80 percent of the nation’s police force could be considered corrupt and were receiving 
around eight hundred million dollars annually in the way of bribes from drug cartels.13  
While drug-related corruption is at its worst at the municipal and state level, where police 
officers are most likely to come into direct contact with traffickers, it does not end 
there.14  Some of the most egregious acts of police corruption generally and drug-related 
police corruption specifically have been committed by Mexico’s federal law enforcement 
agencies.15 
This thesis seeks to explain the very different levels of police corruption in 
Mexico and Colombia.  It describes and analyzes the divergent paths police corruption 
has taken in these two countries.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the 
level of corruption in the Colombian police was much higher than today. By contrast, 
police corruption in Mexico has continued to get worse since the early 1980s.  As chapter 
three will make clear, drug-related police corruption followed a very unique path in 
Colombia.  This very particular situation provided the context in which the Colombian 
government was able to curb, if not nearly eliminate drug related police corruption by the 
late-1990s.  This thesis will explain why, since the early 1980s under successive 
presidents, there have been a series of failures in police reform directed at corruption in 
Mexico.16  It will also explain why in Colombia the CNP went through a largely 
successful anti-corruption reform process in 1995 under General José Serrano.17 
                                                 
13 S. D. Morris, "Corruption and the Mexican Political System," Corruption and Reform 2, no. 1 
(1987), 7.  
14 Benjamin N. Reames, "A Profile of Police Forces in Mexico" In Reforming The Administration Of 
Justice In Mexico, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius and David A. Shirk (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2007), 118. 
15 Laurie Freeman, State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico, Unintended 
Consequences of the War on Drugs. (Washington D.C.: Washington Office of Latin American Affairs, 
2006). www.wola.org  (accessed  November 26, 2007.  
16 Maureen Meyer, "WOLA.ORG – the Washington Office on Latin America – Mexico Aid Package 
should Improve Civilian Institutions, Says WOLA Director," 
http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=590&Itemid=8 (accessed 
November 26, 2007).  
17 Marcos P. Moleznik, ed., Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 22; Jorge Chabat, "Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for 
Maneuver," ANNALS,AAPSS 582 (2002), 140.  
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For a long time, one of the dominant explanations for police corruption rested on 
the character, or lack thereof, of individual police officers.  It was believed that those 
police officers that engaged in corruption did so because of their lack of ethics or moral 
values.  Once it became public knowledge that a police officer was corrupt, 
administrators would quickly handle the problem or get rid of the “rotten apple or 
apples.”  The remedy would be to apply harsh discipline and most typically fire or 
imprison the police officers concerned for their acts of corruption.  However, independent 
commissions and sociological field studies increasingly made it clear that police 
corruption was a problem that went well beyond a handful of unethical and immoral 
police officers.  Police forces often have a number of deep-seated organizational 
problems that transcend the very real issues of inadequate recruiting, a lack of training in 
ethics, not to mention relaxed supervision and the difficulties associated with carrying out 
effective investigations of corrupt behavior.  Based on this, it is important to understand 
(1) individual factors related to particular officers or a particular situation, (2) 
organizational or agency-related factors, and (3) broader external or society-wide factors. 
These three factors are extremely useful in terms of addressing general types of 
corruption, such as “traffic bribes or accepting money to look the other way” in relation 
to “low level felonies.” However, the focus of this thesis is on the causes of drug-related 
police corruption in both Colombia and Mexico and why levels of drug-related corruption 
are currently much worse in Mexico.  By combining conventional explanations for police 
corruption generally with country specific factors (be they historical or related to a 
particular conjuncture of events) it becomes clear why drug-related police corruption is 
much worse in Mexico than in Colombia today. 
Moving beyond, conventional explanations, then we need to look first at the 
structure of the police force and the key role this plays in the overall level of corruption.  
The Mexican police force is highly decentralized.  There are about 400,000 police 
officers in the country and about 3,000 different police departments, at the municipal, 
state, and federal levels.  The Colombian National police force, by contrast, consists of 
about 170,000 police officers within a highly centralized chain of command that falls 
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under the direct control of the national government.18  Decentralized police forces are 
thought to be more susceptible to police corruption.19 
Second, the size and ideology of drug-trafficking organizations shapes both the 
extent to and the way in which and they rely on corruption in their interactions with the 
police.  Today, in Mexico there are four major cartels (Tijuana, Juarez, Gulf and Sinaloa) 
which arguably have a much greater ability to corrupt than that of the smaller cartels or 
“cartelitos” currently dominating the drug trade in Colombia.20  The Mexican cartels can 
be compared to the Cali and Medellin Cartels that dominated Colombia during the 1980s 
and continued to do so up to the mid-1990s.  In this period levels of drug-related police 
corruption were somewhat higher in Colombia than today. 
Third, the history of the “Political Criminal Nexus (PCN)” has a lasting effect on 
police culture.  The manner in which the PCN evolved in Colombia and Mexico helps 
explain why we see higher levels of police corruption in present-day Mexico than in 
Colombia.  Both Colombian and Mexican politics were and are grounded in patron-client 
relationships.  However, as Ronald P. Archer and Matthew S. Shugart have emphasized, 
historically the PRI “successfully permeated the entire system of living in Mexico.” They 
argue “that everyone—the police officer on the street, the mayor of the city, the governor 
of the state, the Ministry of Finance, the attorney general of the nation–were all indebted 
to the party bosses and ultimately to the President.”  Under these circumstances, “no 
controversial action could be taken by a patron without checking with his or her patron, 
and on up the line.” 21  Unlike Mexico, it can be argued that whatever its shortcomings 
                                                 
18 Uruena, Police Corruption in Colombia, 583. 
19 Ronald D. Hunter, "Three Models of Policing," Police Studies 13, no. 3 (1990), 118-122.  
20 Freeman, State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico, Unintended 
Consequences of the War on Drugs, 23-26,133,142; Jeremy McDermott and Oscar Becerra, "Mexican 
Drug Trade Faces Fragmentation," Jane's, 
http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2003/jir00
604.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Mexican drug trade faces 
fragmentation&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JIR& (accessed November 30, 
2007).  
21 Ronald P. Archer and Matthew S. Shugart, "the Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in 
Colombia" in "Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America" (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 177.; Stanley A. Pimentel, "the Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico" in 
“Organized Crime & Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands", ed. John 
Bailey and Roy Godson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 35-38.  
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the Colombian political system never reached this level of corruption.  The patron-client 
system that existed in Mexico under the PRI in the twentieth century created the perfect 
environment for the PCN to evolve and flourish.  Therefore, corruption in Mexico is a 
wide societal problem brought on by a political system that was controlled for nearly a 
century by a single party that had a little or no need to account for its actions.22  Research 
shows that in some countries such as Mexico, police corruption may be a part of a highly 
organized network linking corrupt public officials, the police, the judiciary and the 
criminal underworld.23  In Mexico, the government was and still might be a 
moneymaking machine for the people that run it.24  This thesis does not argue that 
corruption is absent from the history of Colombian politics, nor does it argue that there is 
no corruption in the Colombian government at present.  However, based on the fact that 
the Colombian government is one of the oldest (albeit exclusionary) democracies in Latin 
America, corruption was somewhat harder to conceal in the Colombian political system 
than in PRI-dominated Mexico.  Although drug-related corruption has been traced to the 
highest levels of the Colombian government (e.g., President Ernesto Samper), by all 
accounts, corruption within the political system, the judicial branch, and more 
specifically the CNP is not nearly as rampant as in Mexico.  According to some analysts, 
every Mexican President and chief cabinet member, since the 1970s, has been publicly 
accused of, or widely assumed to have been involved in, some form of drug-related 
corruption.25  
                                                 
22 Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, "Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences," 
Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 2 (2001), 54-71; Richard Dortch, "Crime at AvtoVAZ: Is there a 
Management-Criminal Nexus?" Transnational Organized Crime 5, no. 2 (1999), 195-196; Pimentel, "the 
Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico," in Organized Crime & Democratic Governability: 
Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands, 33-57.  Economic and Social Council, United Nations, Civil 
and Political Rights, Including Questions of: Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, 
Impunity, fifty- eighth sess., January 24, 2002, 
http://www.juticeinmexico.org/resources/pdf/Civil_Political_rights.pdf (accessed August 28, 2007).  
23 Jorge F. Menendez, "Mexico: The Traffickers' Judges," 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/newsletter/2007/may_2007/spotlight (accessed June 21, 2007).   
24 Sebastian Rotella, ed., Twilight on the Line: Underworlds and Politics at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 
1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1998), 105.  
25 Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, Combatting Corruption in Latin America (Washington, 
D.C.; Baltimore, MD.: Published by Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Distributed by Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2000), 118.  
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The functioning of the Political-Criminal Nexus in Mexico depended historically 
upon local political office holders having control over police appointments.  Under the 
so-called “plaza system” (the significance of the term and its wider usage will be clarified 
in a moment), the criminal would pay the local police chief for a certain amount of 
protection and immunity; a certain percentage of this bribe would work its way up 
through the political party hierarchy until it reached the highest levels of the political 
system.  La Plaza refers to police authority and its official jurisdiction; however, for 
Mexican drug dealers it has an alternative meaning: it is about “who has concession to 
run the narcotics racket” in a particular plaza.26  Within the plaza system, the local police 
chiefs and federal agents typically operated as an intermediary between the criminal and 
the politician thus creating a situation where neither criminal nor politician ever had to 
conduct business directly with each other.27  The plaza system in Mexico is particularly 
important in the context of this thesis, as there is no evidence of a comparable system 
linking drug traffickers, Colombian politicians, and the CNP.  It draws attention to the 
importance of country-specific factors in explaining the difference between drug-related 
police corruption in Colombia and Mexico. 
C. SOURCES AND THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is based primarily on secondary sources.  Congressional sources 
include the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports.  Other sources include 
periodicals, U.S. government and non-government reports, working papers, as well as 
books and journals articles pertaining to both general corruption and police corruption in 
Mexico and Colombia.  Also accessed were official web sites of the Washington Office 
of Latin American Affairs (WOLA), the Justice in Mexico Project administered by the 
University of San Diego, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), Transparency International and the World Bank.  The JANE’S 
and STRATFOR databases were also used.  Primary sources consist of interviews with 
                                                 
26 Terrence E. Poppa, Drug Lord: The Life and Death of a Mexican Kingpin: A True Story (New 
York: Pharos Books, 1990), 40-41.  
27 Rotella, Twilight on the Line: Underworlds and Politics at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 104. 
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Mexican and Colombian Naval Officers attending school at the Naval Postgraduate 
School and email correspondences with Mexican and Colombian regional experts both in 
and out of country. 
Chapters II and III of the thesis present a comparative view of past and current 
levels and the nature of police corruption in Mexico and Colombia.  As mentioned 
earlier, official data on corruption rates is incredibly hard to obtain.  However, there are 
several sources or methods used to estimate the extent of corruption, including surveys of 
the general public and police officers, sociological field studies, independent 
commissions, case studies, books and periodicals and information provided by with 
specific country government officials.  These will demonstrate tangible differences in the 
overall level of police corruption in Mexico and Colombia.  These two chapters also look 
at drug-related corruption in various sub-national regions, thus pointing out that certain 
regions of both countries are or were more susceptible than others based on drug 
exposure and cartel presence. 
These chapters also address the anti-corruption reform efforts in Mexico and 
Colombia.  In the case of Colombia, the period of reform initiated by General José 
Serrano serves as a break in time separating two distinct periods containing different 
levels of corruption for the CNP.  In the case of Mexico, successive reform efforts over 
the past two decades have been unable to ease the epidemic levels of drug-related police 
corruption. 
Chapter IV is organized around the competing explanations for police corruption.  
It explains the difference in levels of drug-related police corruption in Mexico and 
Colombia as well as the relative success of police reform in Colombia and its failure in 
Mexico.  Conventional explanations offered by criminologists and policy analysts that 
stress administrative factors are important in the two cases.  However, the chapter also 
highlights the organizational structure of the police forces (decentralized versus 
centralized) and factors external to the organizations (political-criminal nexus, size and 
ideology of the cartels) that are needed to understand the significantly different levels of 
corruption between the two countries as well as change over time in each country. 
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Chapter V provides a summary of findings and then very briefly evaluates the 
extent to which President Calderon’s proposals to reform the policy in Mexico are likely 
to reduce the endemic corruption that plagues the forces.  It argues that, while there are 
some novel elements in the reform, it is too similar to past failed reform efforts to 
succeed.  Those efforts, like the current initiative, do not make enough systematic 
administrative changes in areas such as infrastructure, salaries, training, recruiting, and 
internal control and transparency and fail to provide the resources necessary for the 
police, instead relying too heavily on the military for drug control efforts.  Finally, the 
conclusion warns that the current effort by the CNP to increase its force levels rapidly, 
and establish a presence in parts of the country where the drug trade is suspected to be 
strongest, will have a negative effect on levels of police corruption. 28  In sum, this thesis 
looks at trends of drug-related police corruption over time using both conventional 
explanations and a country-specific approach in order to understand the marked 
differences in the levels of drug-related police corruption in two countries that are both 
leaders in the international drug trade.  
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II. DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION IN MEXICO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest challenges facing the Mexican government today is eliminating, 
or at least dramatically curtailing, the problem of drug-related police corruption.  Mexican 
citizens for the past several decades have consistently ranked crime and corruption, and more 
recently drug-related police corruption as one of their top concerns.29  Despite the 
government’s best efforts, the majority of Mexicans continue to experience the day-to-day 
problem of corrupt police officers.  At the street level Mexicans are regularly forced to pay a 
mordida (literally a bite, but best translated as bribe) in exchange for the dismissal of charges 
(real or imagined) by the police officers concerned, in relation to traffic violations and a 
range of petty crimes.  This is a minor problem, however, when compared to the almost one 
billion dollars that drug traffickers distribute to Mexico’s police force every year.30  
According to Jorge Chabat, a Mexican criminologist, drug money has made its way into 
every corner of law enforcement activity in Mexico.31  Drug-related police corruption has 
reached endemic levels and is now a national security problem for Mexico and a major 
concern for its neighbor to the north.32 
                                                 
29 Pablo Picato, ed., A Historical Perspective on Crime in Twentieth Century Mexico City (Notre 
Dame, Ind.; San Diego: University of Notre Dame Press; Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of 
California, 2007), 66-77; John Bailey and Jorge Chabat, Transnational Crime and Public Security: 
Challenges to Mexico and the United States, 18 (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies/University 
of California, San Diego, 2002), 12; Pablo Paras and Ph D. Coleman Ken, The Political Culture of 
Democracy in Mexico: 2006 (Vandertbilt University: Latin American Opinion Project (LAPOP), 
December 2006.; Jay Root, "Mexico Crime Continues to Surge," McClatchy Washington Bureau, 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/19879.html (accessed January 13, 2007); "Cpi / surveys 
indices / policy research / Home – Transparency International," 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (accessed February 13, 2008).  
30 Steven D. Morris, "Corruption and Mexican Political Culture," University of South Alabama, 
2006), 
http://www.southalabama.edu/internationalstudies/sdmweb/crptn%20and%20political%20culture.pdf 
(accessed October 16, 2007).  
31 George Flacus, "Drug Money Worsens Corruption in Mexico," Voice of America, 
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-07/2006-07-26-
voa23.cfm?CFID=214387537&CFTOKEN=69174087 (accessed December 20, 2007).  
32 David A. Shirk and Alejandra Rios Cazares, eds., Reforming the Administration of Justice in 
Mexico (Notre Dame, IN.; San Diego: University of Notre Dame Press; Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 
University of California, 2007), 1.  
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In the past few decades, drug-related corruption has increasingly eroded the 
already crippled Mexican law enforcement system.  The drug cartels currently operating 
in Mexico are the contemporary equivalent of the Cali Cartel and the Medellín Cartel in 
Colombia when the latter were at the height of their power in the 1980s and the start of 
the 1990s.  In this period Mexican cartels began to grow rapidly and by the mid-1990s, 
just as the Colombian cartels were spiraling out of control and then out of existence, the 
Mexican cartels had an annual income of about ten billion dollars. By 1997 the Mexican 
cartels were estimated to be worth more than forty billion dollars, which was equal to 10 
percent of the country’s total gross domestic product (GDP).33  The enormous profits 
earned from the illegal drug trade since the 1980s have provided Mexican drug cartels 
with the ability to buy protection from official prosecution for smuggling drugs 
throughout Mexico and into the United States. 
At the very broadest historical level, it can be said that corruption has flourished 
in Mexico since the conquest of the Aztec Empire by Hernan Cortes in 1519.  The 
conquest and the establishment of New Spain led to three centuries of Spanish 
occupation, exploitation and neglect, followed after independence in the 1820s by a half 
century of post-Spanish instability.  By the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
Mexican political system had stabilized under the corrupt dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz.  
What became known as the Porfiriato (1876-1910) collapsed in 1911 and a decade of 
revolution and civil war paved the way for the establishment of the one-party state under 
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which ruled Mexico down to the end of 
the twentieth century.  Corruption flourished under both Diaz and the successor political 
system presided over by the PRI.  The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which 
went through a series of both organizational and name changes in the early decades, was 
consolidated under President Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) even though it was not 
formally established as the PRI until 1946.  The PRI, and its precursors, provided 
political leadership for Mexico under the guise of democracy for a period of seventy-one 
years.  The PRI method of leadership was an authoritarian “patron-client” system.  For 
                                                 
33 James L. Zackrison, "From Clothes to Cocaine: Five Hundred Years of Smuggling in Mexico." 
Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement 10, no. 2 (2001), 104-105.  
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seven decades it used social control via an elaborate system of patronage to dominate 
every aspect of political and economic activity.  In later years (via the military and 
police) it increasingly managed and taxed drug-traffickers and organized crime.  Under 
this system, top government officials successfully subordinated criminals and provided 
the latter with impunity and protection for the right to operate within the particular areas 
of Mexican territory.  As mentioned in the introduction, it appears that every PRI 
Mexican President (the jury is still out on the post-PRI presidency of Vicente Fox—
2000-2006—while his successor Felipe Calderon is not scheduled to leave office until 
2010) was involved directly or indirectly in drug-trafficking and profited from other 
forms of organized crime through key national level ministries (such as, defense, interior 
and justice).34  In the Mexican case, all the state’s federal or local security and justice 
structures were centralized. This guaranteed the exercise of power without a 
counterbalance, and ensured that the institutionalized power of the PRI was able to 
impose its informal rules on organized crime (see Figure 2). 
The 2000 Mexican Presidential elections ended seventy-one years of political 
hegemony by the PRI.  Among many other things, this shift displaced those who 
controlled the Political Criminal Nexus (PCN).  This led to the eventual breakdown of the 
central control system over drug-traffickers.  Thus as Mexico entered the 21st century no 
institutional figure, be they a military, interior ministry or justice official had sufficient 
executive power to force drug traffickers to observe the fixed rules–even if they were 
informal.  The year 2000 clearly marked the passing of the baton from the hands of PRI 
to the opposition party Partido Accion Nacional (PAN: National Action Party).  However 
many analysts agree that disruptions to the PCN had already begun to surface in 1994, 
before the transfer of presidential power from Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) to Ernesto 
Zedillo (1994-2000). In particular, one of President Ernesto Zedillo early initiatives was 
to appoint Fernando Lozano Gracia, a member of the PAN, as the Procuraduría General 
de la República (PGR).  Appointing a non-PRI politician or official to a national level 
cabinet position was a hitherto unknown event.  Zedillo clearly understood that in order 
                                                 
34 Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico" in Organized Crime & 
Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands, 34, Bailey and Chabat, 
Transnational Crime and Public Security: Challenges to Mexico and the United States, 17.  
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to rid the PGR of drug-related corruption he would have to perform major surgery on the 
justice apparatus, and that would not and could not even get started with a PRI official in 
charge.  For example, he wanted to conduct a legitimate independent investigation into 
allegations of PRI campaign funding irregularities.35  Zedillo recognized that a clean 
PGR was vital for a cleaner Mexican system of government.  In addition, it is important 
to note that as of July of 1997, the PRI was, for the first time, no longer the majority in 
the House of Delegates. It also lost two additional governorships to the PAN and the 
PRD.  This, plus Zedillo’s attack on his own political party caused a significant erosion 
of institutional authority.  Because of this political shift, the PRI lost its capacity to 
centrally exercise control over the drug-traffickers.  At the national level, the PRI was no 
longer able to provide the type of protection and immunity it once did to drug-traffickers, 
thus the leading drug-traffickers began seeking out new types of ad hoc coalitions, with 
municipal and state police officials, or with relatively isolated federal police officials (see 
Figure 6).  This does not imply less corruption, but simply a greater degree of 
unpredictability in the relationships between organized crime and public officials.  This 
set the scene for the ascendancy of a new style of drug trafficker.  Since the late 1990s 
down to the present, the leaders of Mexico’s main drug cartels, in a growing range of 
circumstances, now have the upper hand over government officials.36 
                                                 
35 Sigrid Arzt, "PAN at the Head of the Attorney Generals Office" In Organized Crime & Democratic 
Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands, eds. John J. Bailey and Roy Godson 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 105. 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0743/00011649-d.html; Leonardo Curzio, "Organized Crime 
and Political Campaign Finance" In Organzied Crime & Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-
Mexican Borderlands, eds. John J. Bailey and Roy Godson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2000), 85-102, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0743/00011649-d.html (accessed December 20, 
2007).  
36 John J. Bailey and Roy Godson, "Introduction" In Organized Crime & Democratic Governability: 
Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Border Lands, eds. John J. Bailey and Roy Godson (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 20-21, http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0743/00011649-d.html 
(accessed December 20, 2007). 
 19
B. MEXICAN POLICE CORRUPTION DURING PRI HEGEMONY 
 
Figure 2.   Top-Down System of Control (From: Perez, 2007). 
In colloquial terms, la plaza is used to describe the jurisdiction of a particular 
policing authority. From the perspective of the drug-cartels, however, it refers to the 
individual or group that has permission to transport and/or sell illegal drugs in a particular 
region.37  Originally, under the concept of the plaza, the drug-trafficker effectively 
bought a license from the local police chief, military commander or perhaps the mayor 
who had been given authority for the area by PRI. This license gave the drug-trafficker 
the right to operate and control the drug trade in a particular plaza.  However, should a 
trafficker experience sufficient success and/or gain a degree of notoriety, he would then 
be visited by judiciales (federal law enforcement agents) and at this point licenses to 
operate would have to be purchased directly from federal agencies.38  If drug-cartels were 
not granted permission to operate within a plaza, the Policía Judicial Federal would bust 
them (PJF: Federal Judicial Police).39 
                                                 
37 Poppa, Drug Lord: The Life and Death of a Mexican Kingpin: A True Story, 41-42. 
38 Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico, 42. 
39 Poppa, Drug Lord: The Life and Death of a Mexican Kingpin: A True Story, 175.  
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The police in a particular area collected “taxes” from the cartels and they in turn 
answered to higher-level officers, who were usually stationed in Mexico City.  The 
“taxes” paid by the cartels would then filter up the PGR/PJF chain of command until 
important officials at the top got their cut.  This process was referred to as “la copa” (best 
translated as “passing around the cup”); which served as a method of personal enrichment 
for both law enforcement personnel and politicians (see Figure 3).40 
 
 
Figure 3.   Informal Taxation System placed on drug traffickers, 1980s-to-mid-1990s. 
(From Pimentel, 2000) 
Up until the late 1990s, very high-level PRI and PGR officials were notorious not 
only for receiving their share of la copa, but also for selling plaza law-enforcement 
positions to national and judicial police commanders.41 
These comandantes would pay high prices for their positions, because 
their job would entail managing one or more plazas that paid huge 
dividends in the form of drug money and gifts.  However, during this  
 
 
                                                 
40 Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico," 43.  
41 Carlos A. Perez, 2005 El Estado En Crisis: Crimen Organizado y Politica. Desafios Para La 
Consolidacion Democratica (PhD, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), 124, 
http://innova.fox.presidencia.gob.mx/archivos/8/2/4/1/files/archivos/sip-3766.pdf (accessed December 10, 
2007).  
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period at the top of the plaza system were the federal police who 
subordinated the state and municipal police within the drug plaza 
system.42 
It has been estimated that plazas in the interior of Mexico, such as those in the states of 
Chiapas or Chihuahua, were sold for around $USD1 million. Meanwhile, coastal plazas, 
such as Veracruz on the Caribbean and Jalisco on the Pacific, were sold for 
approximately $USD2 million and border plazas (such as Baja California Norte and 
Juarez) could cost the official in charge about $USD3 million to buy.43  These federal 
comandantes would pay for their purchase in monthly installments up the chain of 
command, and their own income in turn came from the lease of the plazas to the drug-
cartels and human smugglers.44  This thesis has not uncovered any information that 
allows us to assign specific numbers to the profits earned by state officials in the past and 
by those who might still be operating in this fashion.  The profits acquired can only be 
assumed to be enormous based on the fact that back in 1916 the going rate for the Baja 
California Norte plaza was an initial cost of USD$45,000, with monthly rents between 
$USD10,000 and $USD15,000.45  The importance of the plaza system by the 1980s is 
clearly illustrated in the following figure, which indicates that the major drug corridors 
run through the heart of Mexico’s main drug plazas.  
                                                 
42 Zackrison, "From Clothes to Cocaine: Five Hundred Years of Smuggling in Mexico," 118.  
43 Ibid; Perez, El Estado En Crisis: Crimen Organizado y Politica. Desafios Para La Consolidacion 
Democratica, 124.  
44 Zackrison, "From Clothes to Cocaine: Five Hundred Years of Smuggling in Mexico," 118. 
45 Luis Astorga, Crimen Organizado y Organización Del Crimen (Mexico D.F.: Instituto de 
Investigaciones de la Univeridad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1998), 6-7.  
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Figure 4.   Major drug corridors correlated with known Mexican drug plazas.  
(From STRATFOR, 2007). 
The primary government enforcer during the period of PRI hegemony was the 
federal police under the supervision of the PGR.  As noted, data on government 
corruption is, not surprisingly, extremely difficult to come by.  However, a general sense 
of the degree of corruption at the federal level during the 1980s and 1990s can be gleaned 
from a series of interviews with high-ranking former officials from the Mexican 
government.  These interviews were conducted by the criminologist and twenty-nine-year 
veteran special agent of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Stanley 
Pimentel.    He spent the last five years of his career in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. 
According to Pimentel, during the 1980s political elites used the police to put 
pressure on drug-traffickers.  His source A stated that both prior to, and during the 1980s, 
the Minister of the Treasury (Hacienda) did not provide a budget for the Mexican 
Attorney General’s Office, Procuraduría General de la República (PGR), or the Policía 
Judicial Federal (PJF: Federal Judicial Police).  As a result, they had to find alternative 
ways of funding so that they could remain in operation.  For decades, these agencies had 
assigned their personnel to offices (plazas) and in return expected them to carry out both 
their official and unofficial duties.  The latter entailed “taxing” the drug cartels and 
ensuring that drug-traffickers and organized crime groups made their regular payment of 
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“taxes” in exchange for impunity and freedom to operate within the boundaries of the 
designated plaza.  As long as the drug cartels adhered to the rules set by the PRI and the 
PGR, they were allowed to operate; however, if they broke the rules, they would be 
imprisoned or worse, killed.  The police and their commandantes survived and profited 
from “taxes” paid by the drug traffickers.  Source A stated that the chain of command 
looked the other way, even though it was well known at every level that the federal police 
were exploiting criminals and drug-traffickers.  Ultimately, police officers and 
politicians, even those at the very top, continued to look the other way because they knew 
that a percentage of the “taxes” trickled up the chain of command, ultimately lining their 
own pockets in Mexico City.  
Another source interviewed by the same researcher confirmed this information. 
Source B said that during this same period “the chief of police or some other public 
official such as the PGR, who is normally assigned to a plaza for a period of six years 
would serve as an intermediary between drug traffickers and the PGR/PJF hierarchy.”46 
According to both of Pimentel’s anonymous sources, personnel in official PGR uniform 
would fly from Mexico City to plazas in an official PGR/PJF aircraft.  Upon arrival, they 
would take custody of suitcases full of money from PGR/PJF plaza holders and escort the 
money back to the PGR/PJF headquarters in Mexico City.  From 1988-1994, the PJF was 
directed by Rodolfo Leon Aragon and Adrian Cerrera Fuentes, who would distribute the 
money between themselves and their PJF supervisors, before sending a portion to a slush 
fund assigned to Los Pinos (the presidential palace).47  Meanwhile, Pimental was told by 
a third source (who was convicted of drug trafficking) that: “nadie sin protectors,” by 
which he meant that in order for drug traffickers to be successful and avoid death or 
imprisonment, the federal government had to bless their drug-trafficking operations.  This 
source noted that official protection allowed marijuana and heroin to be cultivated in 
plain view for over three decades. 
Starting in the 1990s, a new phenomenon began to unfold. Mexican law 
enforcement introduced what was referred to as the “limousine service”: the military and 
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the PGR, through the use of the PJF, state and local police, would safeguard the passage 
of drugs from one destination to another.48  During the 1990s, U.S. Customs Agents 
made over 120 arrests of Mexican military and police officials for unofficial incursions 
onto U.S. soil; virtually all these incursions were drug related.49  
In 1997 General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, head of the National Institute to Combat 
Drugs (ICND) in Mexico, was charged with aiding and abetting drug traffickers, 
providing undeniable evidence that even Mexico’s top security agencies were doing the 
bidding of drug cartels.  The ICND was essentially Mexico’s version of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the United States.  The Rebollo scandal illustrates 
how deeply drug trafficking had burrowed into the Mexican security forces, subverting 
government officials at every level.50  Rebollo was sentenced to more than seventy-five 
years in prison for being on the payroll of the Juarez Cartel (headed at the time by 
Carrillo Fuentes), while attempting to dismantle the Tijuana Cartel, headed by the 
Arellano Felix brothers.  Rebollo sold sensitive government intelligence information and 
official PGR credentials to members of the Gulf Cartel.51 The ICND was subsequently 
dismantled. 
In addition to the endemic corruption within the federal law enforcement 
agencies, incidents of drug-related police corruption in the mid-1990s increasingly began 
to surface at the state and municipal level as well.  Up to this point, the drug cartels had 
interacted primarily, directly or indirectly, with federal police officials and independent 
ties did not exist with state and municipal police, even though the latter may have dealt 
with drug traffickers on behalf of the federales.  However, by the mid-1990s, as we have 
seen, the PRI’s centralized control over security institutions began to falter.  Towards the 
                                                 
48 Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico,". 46-47; Patrick O'day, "The 
Mexican Army as Cartel," J.Contemp.Crim.Justice 17, no. 278 (2001), 248, 
http://ccj.sagepub.com/cgi/contents/abstract/17/3/278 (accessed March 23, 2007).  
49 Phil Brennan, "Mexican Army Invades U.S." 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/7/134033.shtml (accessed 6/4/2007, 2007).  
50 Susan E. Reed, "Frontline: Murder Money & Mexico: Readings: Certifiable – Mexico's Corruption, 
Washington's Indifference," 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/readings/newrepublic.html (accessed December 
13, 2007).  
51 Reames, A Profile of Police Forces in Mexico, 124-128.  
 25
late 1990s, the federal police had more or less lost their control and influence over the 
major drug-cartels.  The cartels increasingly established direct ties at the state and 
municipal level of policing, in addition to the federal level, and police corruption became 
“multi-directional” (see Figure 5). 
One obvious result of this shift was the increase in police-on-police violence as 
federal, state and municipal police officers found themselves in the service of rival 
cartels.  Alternatively federal officers, attempting to crack down on drug trafficking, 
ended up in violent confrontation with municipal or state police.  The latter was the case 
in Tijuana in December 1993 when a machine-gun battle erupted between federal anti-
drug agents and state police guarding one of the Arellano Felix brothers.  This incident 
led federal prosecutors to charge a dozen police officials from all three levels of law 
enforcement: federal, state and municipal.52  
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C. MEXICAN POLICE CORRUPTION FROM 2000-TO-PRESENT 
 
 
Figure 5.   Multi-Directional Model of Police Corruption (2000-to-Present)-(From Perez, 
2005) 
Today much of the violence in Mexico is usually “cartel on cartel violence”; 
however, it also involves corrupt police forces under cartel control.  The objective of each 
cartel is to maintain or gain control of the lucrative plazas.  These brutal battles bring 
operatives from rival cartels into each other’s territory in an effort to take over plazas 
located around key drug transit points.53  Drug cartels are only half the equation in terms 
of drug-related violence.  Currently cartels are paying out more than 800 million dollars a 
year to the police at all three levels.54  In 1998, the PGR estimated that over 80 percent of 
all of Mexico’s various branches of police were linked indirectly or directly to drug 
cartels.55 
A good description of this shift in drug-related police corruption and the overall 
political economy of the Mexican drug trade is provided by Carlos F. Perez.  His work is 
based on interviews with a former top-level official from the Office of the Attorney 
General of the Republic; a former local (state) attorney general; a retired officer of the 
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Mexican Army; and a former state undersecretary of Public Safety with broad experience 
in penitentiary management.  His sources also include a former security advisor to the 
Presidency of the Republic; a member of a U.S. intelligence service operating in Mexico; 
and a former top-level official at the Attorney General’s office who has also been a state 
attorney general. 
When the central control structure gave way (2000-to-present), no 
institutional figure, or any member of the political class had sufficient 
executive power to force the different parties to observe fixed rules–even 
if they were informal--nor the agreements reached in the previous scheme 
of things.  The new protection agreements were established with local 
authorities, or with relatively isolated federal officials, within a context 
where the new conditions imposed by the changes in the regime made 
difficult the establishment of general operating rules for the illegal 
business. No public figure now has sufficient institutional capacity of 
coercion to force the great leaders of drug trafficking organizations to 
accept his conditions.  Therefore, as of this dismemberment of the 
centralized structure of protection, the rules and agreements would have to 
be more fluid.56  
The control of drug traffickers prior to the new millennium was at the national level; in 
the present period, the political-criminal nexus is more decentralized.  As one state level 
official noted: 
Every important narco wanted to control his governor. And the governor 
who needed resources for his campaign, well, he lent himself, for 
this…Where I worked as an undersecretary, where the drug trafficking, 
the protection of drug traffickers and auto theft was controlled directly 
from the governor’s office and the governance secretariat, it was in the 
papers, I know for the fact it’s all true.57 
Based on the above testimonies, drug cartels successfully adapted to a situation in 
which impunity and protection no longer came from top government officials.  During 
the first period the federal government (PRI), successfully extorted drug cartels within a 
centralized system of control and the primary enforcer of this system was the federal 
police.  However, because of the disruption caused by the change of power at the top of 
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the political system, the relationship between drug cartels and the federal police began to 
breakdown, giving rise to the increased levels of drug-related police corruption at the 
municipal and state level beyond the purview of the federal authorities. 
In 2005, public security in border cities was at an all time low as drug-related 
homicides soared.  For example, groups of former elite soldiers on the Gulf cartel payroll 
carried out numerous kidnappings, killings and facilitated the corruption of huge numbers 
of municipal police officers in the city of Nuevo Laredo.  Known as los Zetas, and 
formerly associated with Grupos Aeromoviles de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE), United 
States Special Forces had trained them at locations such as Ft. Benning, GA and Ft. 
Bragg, NC. .  The creation of GAFE had originally been intended to help fight the war on 
drugs.  However, many of these specially trained soldiers deserted the Mexican Army in 
order to take up far more lucrative jobs as assassins and security personnel for the Gulf 
Cartel.  Their inside knowledge of the Mexican security forces and their expertise with 
sophisticated weaponry, intelligence gathering, surveillance techniques, and operational 
planning gave the Gulf Cartel the upper hand over its competitors.  The police were now 
outgunned and did not possess the training to counter the Zetas.  The Zetas pursued a 
number of strategies for gaining control in Nuevo Laredo.  They have cowed and 
corrupted large numbers of municipal police within their region of control, converting 
them into spies, protectors, and enforcers.  Municipal police under their control have in 
the past kidnapped individuals suspected of being members of competing cartels and 
handed them over to the Zetas.  The Zetas would hold them for ransom, and use torture to 
gain intelligence about pending operations before releasing, or killing them.58  
The penetration and corruption of the municipal police in Nuevo Laredo by the 
Zetas in general and the June 8 2005, slaying of the newly appointed police chief, 
Alejandro Dominguez (who refused to negotiate with cartels) in particular, resulted in 
significant changes. The Fox administration responded by implementing, the previously 
mentioned Operativo Mexico Seguro (Operation Safe Mexico), which involved deploying 
hundreds of troops and federal police to Nuevo Laredo and other cities plagued by cartel 
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violence and police corruption. Federal forces encountered serious resistance entering 
Nuevo Laredo when the municipal police initially opened fire on them.  Federal police 
removed almost seven hundred municipal police and fifty-seven federal agents from their 
posts and they rescued forty-four individuals who had been kidnapped by municipal 
police officers – making 2006 the worst year for incidents of drug-related police 
corruption and violence in Nuevo Laredo.  The spike in violence and arrests was 
obviously due to the insertion of non-corrupt security forces into a hotbed of drug-related 
corruption within the municipal police force. In the wake of drug tests, interviews, firing 
and arrests, only one hundred fifty police officers remained on the job, compared to the 
seven hundred or more who were sacked or arrested.  In March 2008, the Mexican 
government sent 600 more members of the Federal Preventative Police to Nuevo Laredo.  
Thus far, this has failed to bring an end to the violence and corruption. On September 22, 
2007, there was a major gun battle between Gulf Cartel members and the Federal 
Preventative Police. Subsequently, a number of municipal officers were arrested for 
passing sensitive information to the Gulf Cartel (see Figure 6).59 Meanwhile, in the 
Mexican state of Tamaulipas in October 2007, just prior to the arrest of the municipal 
officers in Nuevo Laredo, twenty-five federal police officers were also detained on 
suspicion of providing protection for the Gulf cartel.60 
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Figure 6.   Nuevo Laredo Municipal Police arriving at PFP Headquarters in Mexico City. 
They were arrested for passing sensitive intelligence on police operations to the 
Gulf Cartel. (From Corn, 2008). 
Other high profile incidences of drug-related corruption at the federal level of law 
enforcement have revolved around the newly constructed Agencia Federal de 
Investigaciones (AFI: Federal Investigations Agency) and other federal police agencies.  
Some of the most notable cases of corruption and human rights violations have been 
attributed to members of the AFI.  Allegations have surfaced that a group of eight AFI 
agents kidnapped a group of Zetas in the resort-city of Acapulco and turned them over to 
the Sinaloa Cartel, which is a key rival to the Gulf Cartel to which the Zetas are 
connected.  The four Zetas where tortured on video and killed just moments after the 
video was turned off.  Shortly afterwards, five of the eight AFI agents were taken into 
custody and arrested for the kidnapping and murder of the four Zetas. However, three 
months later the AFI agents were set free, ostensibly due to lack of information.  The 
waters were muddied further, when, following the release of the AFI agents the Mexican 
attorney general stated publicly that the video and the entire incident had been organized 
to undermine the prestige of the AFI.  Then, the next day, and completely contrary to the 
previous announcement the attorney general’s office released a report that called into 
question the trustworthiness of 1,493 members of the AFI. The report acknowledged that 
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all these agents were under criminal investigation, while 457 were already about to be 
prosecuted. The total number of AFI agents in all of Mexico is about 8,000.61 
 
Figure 7.   The Zetas captured by AFI agents and turned over to the Sinaloa Cartel. 
(From Freeman, 2006). 
During the Fox Administration from 2000 to 2006, several thousand police 
officers were charged with and convicted for drug-related police corruption. Their 
convictions ranged from assistance in the day to day operations of the cartels to the 
receipt of commissions for drug-related kidnappings and murders.  In addition to what 
was occurring in Nuevo Laredo, in 2005, the former state police chief in Ciudad Juárez 
was also under investigation for murder.62  More recently, Mexico City’s international 
airport has emerged as a key point of conflict between cartels struggling for control over 
drug supply chains.  In February 2008, the Justice for Mexico Institute drew attention to a 
government study that indicated the police were involved in trafficking drugs through the 
airport.  The study, Operation of Cartels in Mexico City, indicated that the so-called  
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Charola Cartel (charola is Spanish for badge), made up of police from various agencies, 
was providing security and allowing shipments to pass through the city’s international 
airport.63 
D. PUBLIC TRUST IN THE MEXICAN POLICE  
Given the evidence presented in studies like Operation of Cartels in Mexico City, 
it comes as no surprise that the Mexican police are one of the least trusted institutions.  In 
fact, many observers believe that police corruption has only worsened since the transition 
to democracy in 2000.  For example, in 2002, Mexico was ranked 57th on Transparency 
International’s (TI) Corruption scale, but it had fallen to 74th by 2007.64  It is clear that 
corruption (particularly drug-related corruption) is only getting worse in Mexico.  
National polling data from 2004 indicates that Mexicans perceive the problem of 
corruption as affecting every level of government (see Figure 8).  However, the police 
were perceived to be the most corrupt institution in Mexico.65 
 
 
Figure 8.   Ranking of incidence of corruption by institution on a scale of 0-10 (10 being 
high level of corruption)-2004. (From Morris, 2004) 
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Even though the above data does not distinguish between general and more 
specific drug related corruption, presumably a significant amount is drug-related.  This is 
supported by a study of police corruption in Mexico City. As shown in Table 1, the 
collection of bribes and extortion is both visible and frequent.  This also includes police 
officers selling their services directly.  As Table 1 also shows, police resources are often 
allocated to (1) wealthy businessmen and (2) criminals, primarily drug lords or drug 
dealers.66  More generally, public opinion surveys show that residents of Mexico City 
believe that every level of the police (from municipal to the federal level) has officers 
within their ranks that have ties to the drug cartels.67  
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Table 1.   Corruption in the Mexico City Police Force--2004  Key: L=low; 
M=Medium; H=High; UK=Unknown. Although a distinction between local and 
federal police is important, this  report was unable to identify which police were 
involved in different forms of corruption. (From Anozie et al., 2004). 
Corruption is also widespread at the state and municipal levels, according to other 
studies.  In 2003, the Secretaría de Seguridad Publica de Guadalajara and the 
Contraloría de Estado de Jalisco reported that, out of a total of 6,088 law enforcement 
positions, there were 1,373 dismissals due to suspected corruption generally, or drug-
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related corruption specifically.  If this report is representative, then at least 22.5 percent 
of all state and municipal police in metropolitan areas are corrupt.  According to a 
separate university study, Jalisco’s municipal, state and federal law enforcement agencies 
received an 8.49 on of a scale of 10, ranking as the most corrupt state institution in 2003 
(1 being least corrupt, 10 being most corrupt).  In 2003, 106 PGR and AFI officials were 
dismissed; given the focus of these agencies on combating drug trafficking, it is logical to 
assume that they were fired because of their ties to drug cartels.68  
An unidentified chief of police, during an interview at a wake for a fellow 
policeman who was gunned down by drug traffickers, indicated that drug-related police 
corruption had reached epidemic levels within the municipal police forces in the state of 
Michoacán.  Out of forty policemen under his supervision, he estimated that twenty to 
thirty had ties with drug cartels operating in the area.69   
In another case, a state police commander and twelve other officers in the state of 
Chihuahua were arrested in connection with the killing of eleven people near Ciudad 
Juarez.  In 2005, Mexico’s deputy attorney general lamented that rather than “protecting 
and guaranteeing the safely of the population” the police “are openly working with drug 
cartels”.70  In response to the scale of the problem, the federal government has intervened 
to dismantle entire police departments, sending the military to perform the day-to-day 
operations of the police in many regions.71  Evidence collected from various sources 
indicates that between 70 and 80 percent of Mexicans rate the municipal and state police 
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as incompetent if not corrupt, indicating that they have little or no confidence in their 
ability to perform the normal duties of a police force.72 
Drug-related police corruption in Mexico today is not isolated to any specific 
region. The country’s four major cartels control and operate over large areas.  However, 
drug-related police corruption does tend to be highest in the major transit plazas, 
especially the northern drug plazas along the border with the United States.73  There 
seems to be a positive correlation between areas with high crime rates, police corruption 
and the presence of drug cartels.74  Of Mexico’s thirty-one states, including the Federal 
District, the thirteen with the highest crime levels are all drug-trafficking areas: Baja 
California Norte, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, the Federal District, Jalisco, Mexico 
State, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Tamaulipas, and 
the Yucatan.  (See Figure 2 above for a map of the main drug-trafficking regions).75  
Added to the scourge of corruption is the failure to effectively enforce the law and, 
therefore, the high level of impunity for those that commit crimes.  The national average 
for people who avoid any penalty following initially being arrested or charged with 
criminal activity is approximately 90 percent.76  Based on Figure 9, it can be assumed 
that the presence and influence of the various drug cartels throughout much of the 
country is a major contributing factor to criminal impunity.  Without a doubt, a large 
number of people avoid being charged and prosecuted due to drug-related corruption in 
the police and the justice system.77  
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Figure 9.     Mexican Cartel Areas of Influence. (From Congressional Reporting Service 
Report, October 16, 2007). 
The growing power of the drug cartels and the negative side effects are only 
becoming worse.  In March 2008, in a clear indication of the scale of the problem, the 
Mexican government reinforced the 500 federal police agents that were already deployed 
in Mexico’s northern states with 30,000 more troops and federal police.  This had been 
prompted by the 50 percent increase in drug-related homicides in the regions controlled 
by the drug cartels.  Thirteen Mexican states reported higher than average homicide rates 
for the first two months of 2008.  In addition, it is important to note that these areas also 
correlate with the same regions currently controlled by cartels (see Figure 10).  The 
intervention by federal police and the military in such large numbers indicates that 
significant parts of both the state police and the municipal police are suspected of having 
been corrupted or at least intimidated by the drug cartels.  This is similar to the 2007 
deployment of federal police to clean up the state and municipal police forces in Nuevo 
Laredo.78 
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Figure 10.   Rate of cartel-related slayings in Mexico, January-February 2008 (From 
Donnelly, 2008). 
E. MEXICAN POLICE REFORM EFFORTS 
This section outlines the history of failed efforts to purge the Mexican police of 
personnel involved in drug-related corruption.  At this stage the objective is primarily to 
provide a brief overview, as it will be left to chapter four to discuss in a little more depth 
why Mexico’s historical and contemporary police reform efforts failed, in contrast to 
what are generally seen as successful police reform efforts in Colombia in the past few 
decades. 
Under President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), efforts were made to purge 
agents that were linked to drug trafficking within the highly corrupt Federal Security 
Directorate (Dirección Federal de Seguridad, DFS).  De la Madrid publicly made drug 
trafficking a national security issue and ramped up the role of the military in both 
cleaning up the police and rooting out the drug traffickers.79  However, it was widely 
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believed that de la Madrid’s reform efforts were a masquerade to appease the United 
States.  High-level government officials have described the collusion between the PRI 
and drug traffickers in this period specifically in the context of the PRI’s indirect control 
over the drug trade generally. They emphasized that certain shipments were expected to 
be caught and scapegoats would go to jail in order to make it seem that the state was 
serious about the war on drugs. 
For the protection structure to be profitable and the business to survive 
despite the pressure of the U.S. government and incipient public opinion, 
it was necessary to maintain a façade where the very institutional 
structures that protected the drug trafficking should also evince proof of 
their commitment in the battle against that activity.  The disputes between 
lesser-rank officials belonging to various federal and/or state agencies; 
their arrest upon proof of their participation in drug trafficking; and the 
execution of some of them, allowed for the public presentation of an 
image of a continuing war by the State against drug trafficking 
organizations, and their supposed attempts to infiltrate security 
institutions.  As has been pointed out, according to the evidence in the 
testimonies obtained, the upper echelon of decision makers protected the 
drug trafficking as a whole, even if this implied harm to the particular 
interests of certain officials and criminal organizations.80  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, De la Madrid’s successor, president Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) carried out a second set of reforms.  Like his predecessor, 
he also declared drug trafficking a threat to national security and increased the role of the 
military in drug control efforts. By this time, the DFS has been disbanded, but its 
replacement agencies were equally corrupt.  The Policía Judicial Federal (PJF: Federal 
Judicial Police) was the new federal law-enforcement agency charged with investigating 
drug-related crimes and the Salinas administration engaged in periodic purges of corrupt 
officers in the PJF.  During this era, two new organizations, the Instituto Nacional para el 
Combate a las Drogas, (INCD: National Institute to Combat Drugs) and the Centro de 
Planeación para el Control de Drogas (CENDRO: National Drug Control Center) were 
brought on-line under the direction of the PGR, only to be dismantled years later after 
they too had been penetrated by drug traffickers.81 
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The use of the armed forces in counter-drug operations, as well as the assignment 
of military personnel to civilian designated positions within the sphere of public security 
and law enforcement, which had become increasingly common under Salinas, was 
intensified during the presidential administration of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000).  The 
levels of corruption within the PJF and the PGR’s drug intelligence center were so high 
that Zedillo appointed enlisted military personnel, mid-grade officers and high-ranking 
officers to all levels of both organizations.  He also established the National Public 
Security Council which put the military (both the Army and the Navy) in the position of 
not just decision-making, but policy making role in relation to public security.  In 1999, 
Zedillo created the Policía Federal Preventiva (PFP: Federal Preventive Police) to deal 
with federal crimes as well as to assist local and state agents in criminal investigations of 
federal level offenses.  At the outset, the PFP included around five thousand military 
personnel, out of a total force of less than 10,000.82 
Zedillo’s administration ended in 2000. The election of Vicente Fox, of the 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) to the presidency at the start of the new millennium, 
ending seventy-one years of PRI control of the pinnacle of the political system, was 
widely expected to be a breath of fresh democratic air for Mexico.  However, in relation 
to dealing with the drug cartels, Fox, like the three presidents that had preceded him, 
intensified the use of the military for both domestic security and the battle against the 
drug cartels. For example, he appointed military officers to head the newly created 
Secretaría de Seguridad Publica (SSP: Ministry of Public Security).  He also scuttled the 
extremely corrupt Policía Judicial Federal (PJF: Federal Judicial Police) and replaced it 
in 2001 with the Agencia Federal de Investigaciones (AFI), which fell under the control 
of the PGR.  In 2003, all personnel investigating drug traffickers specifically, and 
organized crime more generally, were consolidated under the Deputy Attorney General’s 
Office for Special Investigation into Organized Crime (Subprocuraduría de Investigación 
Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada, SIEDO).  However, even though Fox did a 
lot of shuffling of personnel, there was no real purging, nor was there any type of 
database available to track those officers who had been fired for corruption.  Therefore 
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when Fox disbanded the PJF, the bulk of the new AFI agents that were hired, were 
actually corrupt PJF officials, so that all this reform effort did was change the name of the 
PJF to the AFI.  Since the creation of the AFI in 2001, more than 800 AFI officers had 
been under internal investigation for corruption or criminal acts, and during the first two 
years of its operations, over 600 AFI officers were found to have ties to drug cartels.  As 
previously mentioned, Fox’s growing reliance on the military became even more 
apparent when he launched “Operation Safe Mexico (Operativo México Seguro) in June 
2005. The operation, which is aimed particularly at combating drug-related violence and 
corruption in the northern states of Mexico, targeted local police departments that had 
been infiltrated by drug cartels.83  
F. CONCLUSION 
As Jorge Chabat noted “Mexico has a long track record in regards to police 
corruption and in the past has only implemented short-term solutions to long-term 
problems which are little better than patches on festering sores.”84  The waxing and 
waning of cartel-related and police-on-police, or police-on-military violence, over the 
past 20 years is exemplary of both the effort to implement reforms and of their failure. 
For example, there were major machine gun battles between federal and municipal police 
in the border city of Tijuana during the mid-1990s. And again, as mentioned above, the 
same type of event took place about a decade later in Nuevo Laredo. These are just two 
dramatic manifestations of the mounting level of drug-related corruption within Mexico’s 
law enforcement agencies.  Future packages such as the proposed Merida Initiative, 
modeled after Plan Colombia, may be step in the right direction.  However, at the time of 
writing the Merida Initiative had been formally rejected by the Mexican government, and 
as some observers note, the results of increased funding and attention, whether 
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spearheaded by Washington or Mexico City, might be to turn a poorly equipped and 
highly corrupt police force into a better-trained and better-equipped and even more 
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III. DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION IN COLOMBIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, a senior official in the administration of President Bill Clinton (1992-
2000) told Time Magazine that the United States was deeply worried about the possibility 
that Colombia could be in the process of becoming a “narcodemocracy.”85  This term has 
been used at various times, both before and since, to highlight the fact that some 
erstwhile democratic countries have had their economic, political, security and social 
institutions corrupted by immensely wealthy and powerful drug-trafficking organizations.  
During the 1980s and mid-1990s drug-related corruption was a major problem in most 
government institutions in Colombia, including the Congress, courts, armed forces and to 
a lesser extent, the Colombian National Police (CNP).   
During the 1980s, Colombian drug cartels reached the height of their power.  The 
scale of their power and influence was such that that they directly challenged the 
sovereignty of the Colombian government itself.86  The 1980s was the golden age for 
Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellin Cartel, whose annual profits were estimated to be 
around twenty five billion dollars in this period.  The Cali Cartel, managed by the 
Rodriquez Orejuela brothers, was the Medellin Cartel’s number one competitor. Its 
earnings in this period are estimated to have been at least eight billion dollars a year.87  In 
the 1980s, their combined profits were equal to 31 percent of Colombia’s official GDP.88   
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These huge sums provided the Medellin and Cali Cartels with the resources to buy 
influence with politicians and any other official at virtually any level of power in 
Colombia.89 
By the start of the twenty-first century, however, the Medellin and Cali Cartels 
had disappeared and the Colombian National Police has increasingly strengthened its 
position vis-à-vis drug traffickers down to the present. This dramatic turnaround in the 
situation can only be understood in relation to developments specific to Colombia.90  
This shift had a profound impact on the current institutional character of the CNP and 
helped it to win back the respect of most Colombians after decades of public distrust and 
fear caused by the illegal drug trade.91  Corruption and even more specifically drug-
related corruption within the Colombian National Police (CNP) is now very minor in 
comparison to other agencies within the Colombian government.  It is also well below 
that of other Latin American police departments according to data that will be presented 
below.92  This chapter does not argue that the CNP is immune to drug-related police 
corruption, because reality is that wherever illegal drugs are produced, distributed and 
sold, there will be some degree of drug-related corruption, especially in the institutions 
that are closest to the problem, such as the police, the judiciary and the military.  
However, the data below makes clear that drug-related police corruption within the CNP 
never reached the same levels that it has in Mexico, despite the fact that Colombian drug-
traffickers controlled and still produce and export 80 percent of the world’s cocaine 
supply.93  That said the CNP’s greatest strength (its experience in fighting guerrillas, the 
paramilitaries and drug-traffickers and its military structure from the early 1980s through 
the mid-1990s), which enabled it to bring down the Medellin and Cali Cartels may also 
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have been its greatest weakness.  In its fight against drug traffickers, the CNP engaged in 
a vast amount of human rights violations. A large number of innocent Colombian citizens 
were literally caught in the middle of the struggle between the CNP and the Medellin and 
Cali Cartels in the 1990s.  
At the same time, the level of violence in the battle between the CNP and the 
Medellin Cartel in particular (and the approach taken by Pablo Escobar’s organization) 
contributed to the curbing corruption in the ranks of the CNP.  As in the case of Mexico, 
official data on drug-related police corruption is hard to find.  However, a general sense 
of drug-related corruption within the CNP from 1980 through the mid-1990s can be 
gleaned from de-classified State Department and CIA cable transmissions and from a 
series of interviews with former high level U.S. and Colombian government officials 
carried out by journalists.  The government officials that were interviewed, who were 
involved in the dismantling of both the Medellin, and later the Cali drug organizations, 
ranged from the former President of Colombia, Cesar Gaviria, to the former Colombian 
Attorney Generals, Eduardo Mendoza and Gustavo de Greiff. The list also includes the 
former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Morris D. Busby and several retired, high ranking 
U.S and Colombian law enforcement officials, including Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) Agent Joe Toft and CNP Generals, Hugo Martinez and Jose Serrano. 94  Prior to 
addressing the existence and character of the ties between the CNP and the Medellin and 
the Cali Cartels, however, what follows will discuss the widespread human rights abuses 
committed by the CNP.  This is important, because, while committed to combating 
Colombia’s most notorious drug organizations the CNP crossed the line far too often and 
abused their power as police officers, which in itself is a form of police corruption.  As 
stated by Maria Llorente, in a telephone interview, “Medellin was a battleground between 
Escobar and the CNP”.95 More than anywhere else it was during the battle in Medellin 
that the CNP committed an excessive number of human rights violations. 
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B. THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE—AS A SOURCE AND 
TARGET OF VIOLENCE   
From early 1980s through the mid-1990s, members of the police were among the 
primary targets for attacks by both drug-trafficking organizations and leftist guerrilla 
forces.  At least 2,834 police personnel were killed during this period, either by guerrillas 
or by assassins working for the Medellin drug organization.96  At the same time as Pablo 
Escobar ratcheted up his attacks on the police in both Medellin and Bogota during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, the Simón Bolívar National Guerilla Coordination Committee 
(CGSB) also increasingly targeted members of the CNP in Bogota. 
 
Figure 11.   Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) building in Bogota in 
1989 after one of Pablo Escobar’s bombs went off.  DAS is equivalent to the 
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. (From Bowden, 2001). 
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This meant that the police had not only to deal with a violent urban guerrilla 
movement, but with Escobar’s particular brand of “narco-terrorism” as well.  In this 
period, Pablo Escobar effectively went to war against the Colombian state as a whole and 
the CNP in particular.  At the center of his struggle with the state was the matter of his 
extradition to the United States.  He publicly announced that he would prefer, “a 
tombstone in Colombia” over “a jail cell in the United States.”97  In an effort to prevent 
Escobar’s capture and extradition the Medellin Cartel carried out bombings of 
government buildings and they hired and trained large numbers of hit-men, known as 
sicarios, who killed thousands of people, including some of the most prominent figures in 
Colombian politics at the time.  For example, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the Colombian 
justice minister was assassinated in 1984; Jaime Gomez Ramirez, head of CNP anti-
narcotics unit, was murdered in 1986. Meanwhile, Guillermo Cano Isaza and presidential 
candidate Luis Carlos Galan were both killed in 1989 at the behest of Escobar.  The 
Medellin Cartel was not afraid of violent confrontation with anyone or any branch of the 
state.  In fact, the Medellin Cartel can be said to have specialized in the murder of police 
officers.98  In late 1989 and 1990, the war between the Medellin Cartel and the CNP 
escalated even further, when Escobar began offering bounties of USD$4,000 for each 
CNP officer killed.  At the same time, he promised as much as USD$12,000 for certain 
important CNP officers and DIFIN (Plain Cloth Investigation Police Corp). The DIFIN is 
one component of the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) and was, and 
still is, basically Colombia’s secret police.  They were also extremely resistant to drug-
related corruption.99 
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During the first five months of 1990, over two hundred police officers were 
gunned down by hit men working for the Medellin Cartel.100 Towards the end of the 
operation of the Bloque de Busqueda [Search Bloc], which had been formed specifically 
to track down and capture Escobar, the latter offered a bounty of USD$27,000 per 
member of the Bloque de Busqueda as part of an increasingly desperate effort to avoid 
capture.101  The government responded by further intensifying the military and police 
presence in Medellin.  It brought in military and police units, including four commands of 
the police’s specialized Elite Corps strike force.  As a result, the monthly homicide rate in 
Medellin climbed from 360 in February 1990 to 654 in June 1990, an alarming twenty-
two murders per day.  Meanwhile, CNP officers managed to bring Escobar’s bombings in 
Medellin and Bogota to an end, but at great cost in terms of the lives of innocent 
civilians.  CNP massacres escalated in the impoverished slums and shantytowns that 
house over one million people around Medellin.   
Seventy percent of all murder victims between January and June were young men 
between the ages of twelve and twenty years old, because they fitted the profile of the 
sicarios, who played a prominent role in the violence organized by Escobar and directed 
at the rank and file members of the CNP.102  An anonymous source interviewed by the 
Washington Office of Latin American Affairs (WOLA) had this to say about the massive 
and direct police involvement in human rights violations during the campaign against the 
Medellin Cartel: 
Anti-narcotic law enforcement efforts have turned into a campaign of 
retaliation, extending beyond traffickers and their contract killers to 
include innocent residents.  The police figure if they killed ten people in a  
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neighborhood where they know gangs of killers operate; they may get one 
or two sicarios in the bunch.  This turned the whole population into an 
enemy.103 
Even though the CNP was only responsible for a fraction of the total homicides 
committed in 1991, the statistics for that year are revealing. The Colombian Attorney 
General reported that CNP officers were responsible for 259 individual homicides, 14 
massacres, which involved an overall total of 50 victims, not to mention 92 cases of 
disappeared persons.  Even more alarming, the Attorney General’s Office received more 
complaints of human rights violations by members of the CNP than those of any other 
single government force.  Fifty five percent of the 3,161 complaints registered were 
directed at the CNP, while only 20 percent were attributed to members of the armed 
forces.  This was reinforced by a survey conducted by the Procuraduria General de la 
Nacion in Bogota, which discovered that the police received more complaints than the 
military in relation to both homicides and torture.104  Table 2 below is based on the 
Attorney General’s Office’s Statistics on complaints filed in relation to human rights 
violations as a direct result of the drug war and is broken-down on the basis of 
government agencies implicated, between January 1990 and April 1991. 
State Agency Homicides Torture Massacres Disappearances 
Military 31.60% 21.00% 38.23% 16.24% 
Police 46.25% 48.48% 20.58% 14.45% 
Others  
Not Det’d.   
3.57% 
   18.57%  
1.36% 
  20.07% 
1.47% 
   39.70% 
4.22% 
    65.10 
Total # of 
Victims 
   560    664   589     616 
Table 2.    Distribution of Human Rights violations committed by the CNP and 
Military in 1991. (From Call, 1993). 
The overwhelming tilt towards the police in the above statistics is clearly 
attributable to the fact that they were the primary agency responsible for confronting the 
Medellin and Cali organizations.  The particularly brutal and indiscriminate character of 
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the Medellin Cartel’s approach to the CNP, and the CNP’s violent, and far from surgical, 
retaliation, ensured that literally thousands of innocent Colombians were injured or died 
in the cross-fire.105 Pablo Escobar’s war on the state generally, and the CNP particularly, 
combined with the counter-insurgency war against the CGSB, served to further militarize 
the CNP.  The growing anger at the drug-traffickers, on the part of the Colombian 
government, combined with their desire to create a safer Colombia also fueled the often 
inappropriate actions taken by the police up to the mid-1990s.106  The death of thousands 
of CNP officers at the hands of the Medellin Cartel, meant that the CNP had a serious 
grudge to settle with Pablo Escobar.  This led to the most controversial issue regarding 
the effort to bring down the Medellin Cartel and capture Escobar.  The CNP and 
Colombian Government could not publicly condone the vigilante group known as Los 
PEPES (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar—People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar).  
However Los PEPES were secretly applauded for their retaliatory strikes against Pablo 
Escobar and his drug organization.107 And, as we will see, they also entered into an 
“unholy alliance” as it were and secretly assisted Los PEPES in their operations against 
the Medellin Cartel. 
C. UNHOLY ALLIANCE: THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE AND 
LOS PEPES  
The vast majority of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence documents that pertain to 
the convoluted relationship between the U.S.-Colombian task force charged with tracking 
down Pablo Escobar and the CNP’s ties with one of Colombia’s most notorious 
paramilitary leaders and drug barons, Fidel Castano, was the leader of Los PEPES, 
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remain classified.108  However, a series of de-classified U.S. intelligence documents, as 
well as interviews with high-level U.S and Colombian government officials provide 
evidence of the involvement of both governments in this “unholy alliance.” The de-
classified documents, which are the main source for this section and were released under 
the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, outline an “alliance” between the CNP, right-wing 
paramilitary groups, particularly Los PEPES and the Cali Cartel with the goal of 
capturing or killing Escobar and dismantling the Medellin Cartel.109 
This particular phase of the no-holds-barred war against Escobar and the Medellin 
Cartel, began in July 1992 after the former had escaped from the luxurious prison, La 
Catedral, where he had been confined since his surrender in June 1991 under a special 
plea agreement with the Colombian government.110  The main factor that encouraged 
Escobar to “escape” was President Gaviria’s decision to transfer him to a real prison in 
Bogota.  This flowed from the fact that the Colombian government had become aware 
that Escobar’s “imprisonment” had not changed the fact that he still ran the Medellin 
Cartel and they were particular incensed about the executions that were being carried out 
on his orders.  The grizzly execution of two of Escobar’s former cronies, William and 
Gerardo Moncada, who were hung upside down and burned to death inside La Catedral, 
was the event that triggered the government’s decision, made on  July 22, 1992, to move 
Escobar to a regular prison facility in Bogota.111  These events eventually sparked the 
formation of Los PEPES, who first appeared on the scene in February 1993. The latter 
organization was set up and headed by Fidel Castano.  A disaffected former associate of 
Escobar and a newfound ally of the Cali Cartel, Castano set out explicitly to seek revenge 
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for the death of the Moncada brothers, as well as the many other people, his erstwhile 
comrade-in-crime had ordered to be killed directly or indirectly.112 
By December 1992, Escobar had been at large for more than six months.  In this 
period there had been more than a hundred unsuccessful raids aimed at his re-capture.  
The failure of the raids was primarily due to presence of corrupt police officers within the 
Bloque de Busqueda.113  During the same period, meanwhile, as Ken Magee, of the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration, stationed in Bogota has observed, “it seemed like 
there was a bomb going off” somewhere everyday. “At times the bombs were meant to 
cause mass destruction and claim lives and at other times they were just meant to cause 
damage to property.”114 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1992 the authorities appeared to be finally getting the 
upper hand.  In January 1993, after another one of the Escobar’s terror attacks, there was 
an immediate counter-attack.  An apartment building where some of the drug lord’s 
family members resided was destroyed by a double car bomb, while a hacienda, owned 
by Escobar’s mother, was decimated by dynamite.115  There is considerable speculation 
as to whether it was rival drug traffickers or rogue police officers, or both, who carried 
out the attacks  The idea that it might have involved policemen seeking to give Escobar a 
taste of his own medicine carries some weight, insofar as no one was actually injured  
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despite the late hour of the explosion. In fact, in the case of his mother’s hacienda, five 
men forced the caretaker, who was alone on the property at the time, to leave before they 
set off the bomb.116 
In any event, two days later a group of self-described patriotic Colombians, Los 
PEPES, took responsibility for the destruction of the apartment building and by 
implication the bombing of the hacienda.  In their statement, Los PEPES said they were 
dedicated to the total annihilation of Pablo Escobar, his underlings, collaborators, and 
property.  Over the course of 1993, Los PEPES took credit for a series of killings and 
kidnappings of members of the Medellin Cartel, as well as the destruction of Escobar-
owned property worth millions of dollars.117  In short order, Los PEPES had killed at 
least thirty-seven of Escobar’s associates.  According to a de-classified CIA report, Los 
PEPES also posted a reward of USD$5 million “for Escobar—dead or alive”, asserting 
that it had a membership of 150 armed individuals, was backed financially by “big 
business” and had links to police.118 Around the same time this CIA report appeared the 
Colombian defense minister, Rafeal Pardo began to express concern that the police were 
providing intelligence information to Los PEPES and were also responsible for some of 
the vigilante acts of terrorism committed against the Medellin Cartel.  CIA analysts go 
even further and attribute the increase in activity by Los PEPES to President Gaviria’s 
demand for an intensified effort to capture Escobar, thus encouraging the CNP to rely 
ever more heavily on extra-legal means to bring the Medellin Cartel and its leader.119 
By this time, the Colombian and U.S. governments were expressing concern (and 
in retrospect were clearly correct) that the police were working with Los PEPES.120  The 
U.S. Ambassador to Colombia reported that the country’s attorney general had “new, very 
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good evidence linking key members of the police task force to criminal activities and 
human rights abuses committed by Los PEPES.” He added that the embassy’s own 
sources “suggested that the police were cooperating with the group at some level” and this 
“included” the passing on of “sensitive information”.121  CIA sources report a series of 
meetings that took place in April of 1993.  It was at one of these meetings that the director 
of the CNP, General Miguel Antonia Gomez Padilla told senior CNP intelligence officers 
to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, leader of Los PEPES, for the purpose of collecting 
intelligence on the Medellin Cartel.122  At around the same time, however, on April 16, 
1993 to be precise (according to the U.S. Ambassador), President Gaviria met with his top 
advisers including senior police officials, and told them to cease whatever was going on.  
Police intelligence commander, General Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco was to pass the 
word to Los PEPES that they must dissolve immediately.  It was believed that Montenegro 
Rinco was not a member of Los PEPES, as such, but he did know the names of some of 
the members and was aware of most of their activities.  According to U.S. Embassy 
officials, it was significant that Gaviria delivered the message via one of his senior police 
commanders.  Among other things, this served to strengthen U.S. suspicions that the 
Colombian President believed the CNP was collaborating directly with Los PEPES; 
however, to date, the precise scope and scale of the relationship remains unclear.123  The 
Los PEPES episode is a good example of the convoluted character of drug-related 
corruption. What is clear is that there were ties between the CNP, the paramilitary 
organization called Los PEPES and last, but not least, the Cali Cartel. As a result of this, 
in the process of dismantling the Medellin Cartel, the CNP indirectly facilitated (at least in 
the short-term) the strengthening, if not the expansion, of the Cali Cartel.  The latter 
became the pre-eminent drug trafficking organization in Colombia until it was 
subsequently dismantled by the CNP. 
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D. COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE OFFICERS ON THE CARTEL 
PAYROLL (1980-1994) 
The story of drug-related police corruption in Colombia since 1980 is obviously 
more than the rise and fall of the Medellin Cartel against the backdrop of the unholy 
alliance between the CNP, Los PEPES and the Cali Cartel.  Corruption and more 
specifically drug-related police corruption is almost always a cartel-initiated, multi-
directional problem for the Colombian government, with each cartel taking different 
approaches to corrupting the police.  The Medellin cartel relied primarily on violence and 
intimidation to corrupt local police officials (see the red arrow in Figure 12 below), while 
its approach to the military was the extensive use of bribery.  The Cali Cartel was much 
more low-key and business like in its approach, preferring to bribe police officers when 
necessary and avoid resorting to the bullet.  In fact the Cali Cartel never pursued an all 
out strategy aimed at corrupting the police such as we have seen in the case of the 
Mexican cartels, nor as already mentioned did they use violence and intimidation against 
the police in the fashion that Escobar did.  Finally, unlike Escobar they did not target the 
military for bribery.  The drug-related corruption practiced by the Cali Cartel, as 
indicated by the broken arrow compared to the solid green arrow, was directed less 
towards the police and the military and more towards other sectors of Colombian society 
(see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.   Multi-Directional Model of institutional corruption, 1980s-to-1990s.  
(From Chespesiuk, 1999)  
Unlike the Cali Cartel’s emphasis primarily on bribery, standard operating 
procedure for Escobar included bombing, assassination, intimidation and bribery. “Plata 
o plomo,” and increasingly, simply “plomo” as practiced by the Medellin Cartel 
ultimately threatened to undermine Colombia’s, already, circumscribed form of 
democratic government.  The drug-related security crisis between 1980 and the mid-
1990s, which centered on the fate of Escobar himself, both impacted on and transformed 
the criminal justice system in the country.  The use of violence and fear by Pablo Escobar 
to advance his interests is indicated by the red arrows in the above diagram.124  
That said both cartels had police officers on the payroll, although their numbers 
never reached the levels we have seen in the case of Mexico, where a very large number 
of police officers work directly for, or receive regularly payments from, with the drug 
cartels. The Medellin Cartel was successful in corrupting large numbers of police officers 
who lived, and operated, in and around the city of Medellin from the early 1980s up to 
Escobar’s death in 1993.125  The security environment in Medellin was horrific and made 
being an honest police officer extremely hard for those who resided in Medellin, not to 
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mention Bogota.  Unlike CNP officers in other regions battling guerillas, police solidarity 
hardly existed in Medellin.  Those honest CNP officers in Medellin did not know if 
members of their own ranks would sell them out to cartel members due to the large 
bounties being offered.  An anonymous CNP officer had this to say about the many 
killings of CNP officers sponsored by Escobar: 
Mr. Pablo Escobar paid two, three million pesos for each agent’s head.  
Many of the policemen working in the Medellin command would sell the 
addresses of their own partners.  And the hit men would show up and kill 
them and their family members.126 
In order to counter suspected drug-related corruption within the CNP in Medellin, the 
Colombian government declared that no native CNP officer from the departments of 
Antioquia, or Paisa could be part of the Bloque de Busqueda, for fear he would secretly 
be on Escobar’s payroll.  Senior Colombian government and CNP officials had good 
reason to suspect that Escobar owned a large portion of the Medellin police force.127  In 
response, the CNP assembled a collection of men from different units, including 
Colombia’s FBI, the DAS and its special branch of judicial police, the DIFIN (Dirección 
Central de Policía Judicial e Investigación), as well as select CNP officers from regions 
that were a long distance from Medellin.128  These officers were also rotated in and out; 
in order to both limit their exposure to opportunities for corruption and to conceal their 
identity for fear that Escobar might attempt to intimidate them via threats on their 
families.  Therefore during the entire period of operation of the Bloque de Busqueda, the 
local Medellin CNP force was excluded from all information about, and participation in 
the search operations.  However as mentioned above, hundreds of police raids were still 
hampered.  As DEA agent Joe Toft, stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota during this 
time, makes clear “corruption within the Bloque de Busqueda was the main reason” for 
the organization’s shortcomings in bringing down Escobar and the Medellin cartel.129   
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According to other U.S embassy sources, the “corruption” inside the Bloque de Busqueda 
was also “the determining factor” in the drug lord’s escape from La Catedral on July 22 
1992.130 
During the prison break, Pablo Escobar and associates also managed to slip out 
without the apparent knowledge of the Colombian 4th Infantry Brigade, which had 
responsibility for the area where Escobar was being held. This was taken as clear evidence by 
the U.S. that the Colombian Army could not be trusted in the ‘War on Drugs’.  In fact, the 
Medellin Cartel had provided the equipment and training for the paramilitary groups that 
shared the Army’s goal of fighting leftist guerrillas, and they even worked together on 
occasion.  Drug cartels, like the Army were anti-communist.  On the other hand, the 
Colombian National Police, due to the murder of thousands of policemen by the Medellin 
Cartel, hated Escobar and, outside of his stronghold in Medellin, were largely resistant to 
being corrupted by him.131  Nor were the vast majority of police officers that were part of 
the Bloque de Busqueda on the Cartel’s payroll. Unfortunately, according to General Hugo 
Martinez, (Former CNP General) a handful of corrupt officers within the CNP (even if they 
were not inside the Bloque de Busqueda) were often enough to alert the entire countryside of 
impending operations against Escobar.132  Despite these hindrances the Bloque de Buscada 
eventually tracked down and killed Escobar on December 2 1993.  More generally, with 
Escobar’s death the CNP brought down the Medellin Cartel.  By allowing his grasp to exceed 
his reach, Escobar galvanized the Colombian state generally, and the CNP more specifically 
contributing to his own demise, and leaving a less corrupt more effective CNP as his legacy.   
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Figure 13.   Members of Colonel Martinez's Bloque de Busqueda celebrate over Pablo 
Escobar's body on December 2, 1993, in a photograph taken by DEA agent Steve 
Murphy. Pablo's death ended a fifteen-month effort that cost hundreds of millions 
of dollars. It effectively eliminated the Medellin Cartel. (From: Bowden, 2001) 
Until the death of Escobar in late 1993, the Medellin Cartel had engaged in an 
unrelenting campaign of violent bullying and assassination against the agents of the 
Colombian state, while the Cali Cartel worked quietly, content with the Medellin Cartel 
being in the spotlight.133  Even before the fall of the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel had 
learned from Escobar’s mistakes as it were and sought to buy the state and even society at 
large rather than wage war on it.134  By the mid-1990s, with the Medellin Cartel 
effectively gone, the Cali Cartel had corrupted most key sectors of society.  By the end of 
the 1980s, the Cali cartel already controlled a vast intelligence gathering network that 
included all public telephone lines in Cali, enabling them to intercept all police and 
military calls. For good measure, they also had more than 5,000 taxi drivers on their 
payroll.135  
As the Cali organization grew, so did its expenses. Apart from the telephone 
system and taxi drivers, it had a sizeable and growing payroll of informants and spies 
who worked in virtually all the key national institutions—the armed forces, the police, 
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the courts, the government, the legislature and the news media.  By 1989, the DEA 
estimated that the Cali cartel was paying a CNP private about USD$ 1,550 per week, a 
captain about USD$ 5,000 per week and a general about USD$ 15,000 per week.  Even 
though these were enormous sums of money, this was viewed as a necessary cost to 
maintain and expand the Cali operation both nationally and internationally.136  As already 
suggested the Cali Cartel focused its corruption efforts on a wide range of government 
officials and the police were important but not their primary focus.  No example better 
supports this claim than the “narco-cassette scandal”, which provided evidence that the 
Cali Cartel had contributed USD$ 6,000,000.00 to the presidential campaign of Ernesto 
Samper. Meanwhile, during Colombia’s second Bloque de Busqueda in pursuit of Miguel 
Rodriguez of the Cali Cartel, the CNP found documents and computer files listing more 
than 2,800 politicians, journalists, congress members, state governors, and military 
personnel, all of whom were on the Cali Cartel payroll.137 Only sixty-four names on the 
list were police officers.138  Shortly after General Rosso Serano apprehended Rodriguez 
and dismantled the Cali Cartel, Ernesto Samper’s vice-president, Carlos Lemos spoke 
publically about certain Liberal congressmen receiving as much as USD$500,000 from 
the Cali Cartel. He also argued that the Cali Cartel often spent as much as USD$ 25,000, 
per vote in Congress to try to block the extradition treaty being asked for by 
Washington.139  During this period, the Cali Cartel successfully corrupted key areas of 
government throughout Colombia, but drug-related police corruption compared to 
Mexico was low and concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Cali. 
E. REFORMING THE CNP: THE 1991, 1993 AND 1995 POLICE REFORM 
EFFORTS  
In response to the security crisis precipitated by the escalating conflict with drug 
traffickers in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Colombian government proposed a series of 
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police reforms.  The civilian-led reform efforts of 1991 and 1993 under the Gaviria 
administration were resisted by the police and failed.  However, many of the ideas from 
these reforms (minus increased civilian control) were incorporated into a reform package 
directed by the head of the Colombian National Police, General Jose Serrano that began 
in 1995.  These reforms were successful in many ways, increasing the effectiveness of the 
police, improving their public image, and curtailing the human rights violations, which as 
argued earlier in this chapter, can be seen as a form of drug-related corruption in this 
instance. 
The first reform package in 1991, which took place under the Gaviria 
Administration was an attempt to make structural and organizational changes within the 
CNP.  The basic elements were, first, the creation of a mechanism to ensure greater 
civilian control over the police and provide civilian incentives for participation in public 
security matters.  Second, the re-organization of the police force was carried out to ensure 
that in the future the CNP would respond to both citizen security and national security 
concerns.  Third, a new professional career track, which would create a less hierarchical 
command structure while increasing the ratio of supervisors over rank and file officers, 
was created.140  These first reforms also introduced regulations that would strengthen 
mayoral and gubernatorial control over policing within their jurisdictions.  Also 
significant was the creation of a civilian police commissioner at the national level that 
would head an external office and provide civilian oversight over the CNP.  The last 
initiative in this first package of reforms was the implementation of the National System 
for Citizen Participation in Police Matters.  This system was ultimately designed to allow 
citizens from all strata of society to provide input on police matters, which would in turn 
assist police officials in guiding and directing their rank and file police officers.  As 
already suggested these 1991 reforms never took hold, but did influence later, successful 
reform efforts. 
The second reform initiative, begun in 1993, aimed to change the existing 
structure of the CNP as an institution.  The plan was to create three separate police forces, 
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which would include urban-, rural- and criminal-oriented organizations, as well as a 
separate investigation unit.  The goal was to setup a police force that could respond to 
two distinct security issues. The urban force would possess a more civilian profile, while 
the rural force would possess more of a military profile and get specialized military 
training in order to operate effectively in regions where guerilla insurgents were based.  
The main goal was to create less of a military-style command structure and one that was 
in keeping with international police trends.  The end product of this last initiative was that 
there would only be two levels.  The last reform initiative laid out a system that gave rank 
and file officers the ability to advance to the executive level (middle management) based 
on their potential and merit as police officers.  The end goal, as one observer has noted, 
was “one career track for high-ranking officers, equivalent to officers found in the 
military and the executive level with only five ranks”. This arrangement “would give 
patrol officers the opportunity to advance to middle management and supervisory 
positions after five years of being a patrol officer.” 141. But, like the 1991 effort the 1993 
reform package was never really implemented. 
Ultimately, the 1991 and 1993 reform measures failed because of “institutional 
obstruction and poor planning.”142  For example, the National System for Citizen 
Participation in Police Matters proved to be too complicated.  One of the components 
necessary for this to operate was the creation of a commission with 23 members from 
varied backgrounds.  At the same time, the CNP senior leadership was patently unwilling 
to even accept recommendations for who should be on the commission from outside the 
CNP organization.  Had the commission got off the ground, its ability to reflect any sort 
of input from “citizens” across a broad spectrum was already undermined by the CNP’s 
efforts to control the appointment of members of the commission.  Meanwhile, the idea 
of three separate forces never got beyond the planning stage.  Instead, the urban 
orientation that had existed since the 1980s remained intact and much later the current 
administration of President Alvaro Uribe increased the size of the rural police 
(Carabineros) in order to maintain rule of law in rural areas where the counter-
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insurgency-insurgency conflict was, or is, significant.  Also, measures to strengthen 
government oversight never got anywhere, because of both poor planning and opposition 
from senior police officers.  Finally, the old career track for high level and mid-grade 
officers remained in place.  This initiative also failed because of poor planning and 
because it would have negatively affected the prestige and privileges of high ranking 
CNP officers.143 
The presidency of Gaviria’s successor, Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) was plagued 
from the start by allegations of receiving a $6 million campaign contribution from the 
Cali cartel.  As a result, Samper was unable to continue with the Gaviria’s efforts to 
assert civilian governmental control over the police.  Samper did, however, realize that 
police reform was sorely needed to confront the public security crisis posed by drug 
trafficking. He delegated responsibility for this to the head of the police, General Jose 
Serrano, who was leading the aggressive and ultimately successful campaign against the 
Cali Cartel, following the vanquishing of the Medellin Cartel in 1993, also had a great 
deal of credibility with the government of the United States. Serrano’s priorities were to 
combat both drug-traffickers specifically and corruption within the CNP generally.  
Under his leadership, the CNP had more or less dismantled the Cali Cartel by the end of 
1994. Then in 1995, by presidential decree he purged more than 8,000 officers from the 
CNP who were thought to be involved in illegal activities.  He used both of these 
accomplishments to argue that there was no need for civilian governmental oversight.144  
Preventing corruption and increasing effectiveness, however, depends on much 
more than just purging officers.  Serrano’s reform efforts included several smaller 
initiatives that fall under the umbrella of the cultural transformation of the police. This 
was aimed at giving the police a more civilian-oriented style, with better leadership, an 
emphasis on improved management, better personnel training and the notion that citizens 
were “clients.”145  Probably the most critical part of this reform effort was the  
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development of a strategic planning board that consisted of all the top commanders from 
every department. It was to meet on a regular basis in order to measure progress and plan 
for the future at a regional and national level. 
Serrano attempted to replace the quasi-military structure with one that would 
present a more horizontal relationship between senior commanders and mid-low ranking 
officers and assignments would be based on the officer’s ability.  In order to accomplish 
this goal the CNP developed contracts with various Colombian Universities to teach top 
commanders courses in a more civilian oriented form of leadership and management.  As 
with previous reforms, this initiative met with resistance because senior officers felt it 
was important to maintain distance from mid and low ranking officers.  Serrano’s last 
reform initiative was a less complex version of the National System for Citizen 
Participation in Police Matters.  Instead of having elected representatives for every strata 
of society, the new system allowed the entire community to participate through the use of 
police surveys. The surveys were intended to gauge police efficiency in areas of response 
and crime control and also serve as a method for the police to improve in the areas in 
which the population deemed it to be deficient.  The second part of this last initiative also 
involved a neighborhood watch program, adopted from a British model.  The Colombian 
model was named, Frentes de Seguridad Local (Local Security Fronts) and Escuelas de 
Seguridad (Security Schools).  The community fronts went from 2,700 in 1995 to over 
6,800 by 2001.  It is estimated that over a half million urban Colombians were 
participating in the Local Security Fronts by the start of the 21st century.146  According to 
researchers, this program did improve public perception of the police in areas where they 
Fronts operated.  However, by 2003 many researchers were skeptical about whether this 
program could be successfully implemented beyond the regions where the Fronts were 
already in place.  It is unknown to what degree this program affects rural municipalities, 
however, it is firmly rooted in two of the country’s three biggest cities, Bogota and 
Medellin.  In these cities in particular, it appeared to be producing positive results in 
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crime control and a positive image for the police.147  There is little no information 
regarding the results of this program in Colombia’s third major city, Cali.  However, 
statistics for violent crimes in 2006 were significantly higher in Cali than the other two 
cities.  It is not unreasonable to take this as an indication that the Front program has not 
been as successful in Cali as it has in Medellin and Bogota.148 
F. CURRENT LEVELS OF POLICE CORRUPTION, 1995 TO 2008 
Police reform efforts, including increased spending on the police, combined with 
changes in the overall operation of the drug industry have contributed to a decline in both 
drug-related police corruption particularly and police corruption more generally in 
Colombia since 1995.  The fall of the Medellin and Cali Cartels led to the emergence of 
more than three hundred cartelitos in Colombia as of the present day.149  The large 
number of small drug cartels are less inclined to utilize open forms of intimidation and/or 
extensive networks of corrupt police and other officials as was the case with the Medellin 
and Cali Cartels.150 
As the increase in the cultivation of coca (the basis for cocaine) and opium 
poppies (the basis for heroin) in Colombia increased between 1990 and the early 21st 
century, small drug-trafficking organizations emerged to manufacture cocaine and heroin 
for delivery.  The vast majority of cartelitos are content to let the non-Colombian cartels, 
principally the large Mexican cartels take charge of delivery to the consumer.151 The 
willingness of the Colombian cartelitos to cede most transportation and delivery 
responsibilities to the Mexicans for distribution within the United States has worked to 
keep the Colombian cartels out of the spotlight and beyond the reach of U.S. extradition 
laws.  As a result of this (and their smaller cellular structure), they do not need to engage 
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in corruption of any form on the grand scale that characterized the defunct Medellin and 
Cali Cartels.  Instead, bribery and intimidation are likely to be used on key lower level 
officials to ease the passage of shipments.152 
Since the mid-1990s, no case of wide spread organizational corruption in the 
Colombian police, comparable to the scale and scope of police corruption uncovered in 
the case of Mexico can be found.  Drug-related corruption since the mid-1990s has 
mostly taken place at individual or small group level, and usually among more senior 
personnel within the organizational hierarchy of the CNP.  For example, in 2002 two high 
ranking CNP generals were arrested for skimming money off the top of United States 
assistance funds (Plan Colombia).  In both cases, the CNP generals were forced to resign 
and they were then prosecuted for their crimes.153  Other cases of drug-related police 
corruption have implicated several DAS custom officials, and senior CNP intelligence 
officers, accused of providing advance intelligence and information about future law 
enforcement operations against drug-traffickers.154 
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Another common form of police corruption tend to be associated with human 
rights rather than drugs, which can be attributed to the on-going armed conflict between 
security forces and leftist guerillas and other criminal organizations.  The data below was 
gathered from an archive of two hundred and twenty nine news paper articles published 
between 2005 and 2007 in Colombia’s leading newspapers.155   
 
State Agency Homicides Torture Massacres Disappearances 
Military 50 6 23 14 
Police 16 1 3 2 
Table 3.   Table 2: Distribution of Human Rights violations committed by the CNP 
and Military based on 229 excerpted newspapers articles from 2005-2007, in 
which events dating back to 1997 were mentioned.   
Both the previous and the next table are not based on any strict rules of social 
research.  However, the data in Table 3 suggests that the CNP is no longer may be the 
main source of violence and human rights violations as it was in 1991.  This shift may be 
the result of the CNP no longer being at war with the Medellin drug cartel and the fact 
that cartelitos are less likely to confront the state. 
 
State Agency Drug Traffickers Paramilitary Guerillas groups 
Military 28 6 1 
Police 11 3 0 
Table 4.   Military and Police Collaboration with Illegal groups (Author’s 
calculation based on articles summarized in Colombian Support Network, 2007) 
Similarly, Table 4 suggests that the CNP is far less likely to collaborate with 
illegal groups such as paramilitaries and drug-traffickers than the military.  This has 
contributed to police-military confrontations between the police and the military on at 
least two separate occasions when several CNP units clashed violently with Army units 
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that were guarding cocaine shipments for drug-traffickers.  In one case, the Army unit 
opened fire on the CNP, killing all the officers in the unit.156 
G. WINNING PUBLIC TRUST: THE CHANGING PERCEPTION OF THE 
CNP 
As the above discussion suggests the drug cartels have penetrated the military. 
This may in part be as a means of securing protection from leftist guerrillas.  This section, 
meanwhile makes clear that, in contrast to the military, corruption may actually be a very 
minor problem within the CNP.  There is no doubt that the police have won back the trust 
of the Colombian civilian population after decades of distrust.  The loss of public trust for 
the police seems to have been primarily a result of their egregious human rights 
violations during the period when they were at war with both guerillas and the Medellin 
and Cali Cartels.  According to Maria Llorente, the early 1990s was a period when 
Colombian society began to lose confidence in the CNP compared to previous levels of 
public trust.157 At the start of the 1990s, public confidence in the CNP was no higher than 
35 percent whereas the confidence in the Army was 50 percent.158  By 1993, public 
confidence in the police had dropped to 21 percent.  This decline in public trust flowed 
directly from the fact that throughout the 1980s, successive administrations placed a 
priority on counter-insurgency and battling drug-traffickers, which lead increasingly to a 
rise in human rights violations.  It also meant that more general crime control, which 
should have been the CNP’s primary responsibility, was put on the back burner.159 
As already suggested, however, the CNP began to regain the trust of the 
Colombian people from the mid- to late-1990s.  There were several factors that 
contributed to this change.  The first factor was that the CNP was the primary institution 
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involved in dismantling the Medellin and Cali drug cartels, and while the process of 
doing so had alienated the public, their eventual success helped to lay the foundations for 
the restoration of confidence in the police.  The second and related factor, which had a 
lasting effect, was the highly publicized 1995 police reform carried out by the charismatic 
police General Jose Serrano, who is still regularly referred to within the international law 
enforcement community as the “world’s best cop.”160  The third critical factor that helped 
the CNP regain public trust was the cultural transformation of the police by Serrano that 
followed on from the purging of a significant number of corrupt officers.161  By 2002 the 
public trust in the CNP had reached, upwards of, 57 percent and climbing.162  The 
average level of public trust for the police throughout Latin America as a whole today is 
only about 30 percent.163 
Furthermore, when the people were asked in 2006 about their trust in state 
institutions that are charged with ensuring and protecting the people’s rights, the CNP 
scored above 50 percent, and had been doing so since 2004.  Also this data is significant 
because it correlates to data gathered by Llorente (see below graph).  In this study, the 
courts, the police, the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoria de Pueblo) and Prosecutor 
General (Fiscalia General de la Naccion) all were found to be held in high regard by 
Colombian citizens.164 
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Figure 14.   Trust in Institution that Protect Rights in Colombia. (From: Raga, 2006). 
Although it is difficult to tell how much the lack of corruption within the police 
force accounts for its positive evaluation, there are reasons to believe this is important.  
The chart below shows that Colombia, after Chile, is one of the countries in Latin 
America where people report the lowest rate of police officers demanding or receiving 
bribes.  Only 4.5 percent of those surveyed indicated that they had been victims of 
extortion on behalf of the CNP. 
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Figure 15.   Victimization: Police Officers Demanding Bribes in Comparative 
Perspective. (From: Raga, 2006). 
Meanwhile, a survey of CNP officers revealed that they themselves thought that 
the three most serious problems that could undermine their institution, in the eyes of the 
public, were first, the commission of human rights violations by the police. Second, 
police failure to prevent the destruction of property and third a general perception that 
they were neglecting their duties, In contrast, the actions most commonly seen as police 
corruption—demanding or receiving bribes and collaboration with illegal groups, 
including drug traffickers was listed well below these top three.165  
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Figure 16.   Human Rights Violations and other forms of corruption are perceived by 
the CNP as larger problems than drug-related corruption. (From Urena, 2006). 
The CNP, controlled by a central bureaucracy, has successfully regained the 
respect of the majority of Colombians in the majority of its departments  The significance 
of it being centrally controlled is that it has regained the population’s trust, without, or 
because, its primary loyalty does not lie with municipal leaders or departmental 
governors.  For example, a survey conducted in Medellin in early 1993 showed that 
approximately 50 percent of respondents from all social strata felt distrust, fear and 
hatred towards the police, while only 16 percent respected and felt protected by the CNP.  
The CNP was so hated that the municipal leaders repeatedly requested that the CNP be 
withdrawn so that a local force could be created, however, the national government never 
agreed to the request.166  Of course, in this period, Medellin was literally a battleground 
between the CNP and the Medellin Cartel, both of which were responsible for high levels 
of bloodshed amongst innocent civilians.  In 1991, the annul murder rate in Medellin was 
381 per 100,000 people. This equates to more than five hundred murders a month.  In 
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2002, it was 184 per 100,000 and last year it fell below thirty, making Washington D.C., 
look bad in comparison.167 The consistent drop in violent crime in Medellin has made it 
once again an attractive city for foreign investment, which has increased by 300 percent 
since the late 1990s.  The same trend seems to be the case throughout Colombia since the 
1995 police reform initiative down to President Alvaro Uribe’s security crackdown, 
which called for the CNP to take a proactive approach to crime control, while still 
combating counter-insurgents in both rural and urban areas.  Today, unlike in the past, 
every major city and almost all rural municipalities now have a CNP presence after the 
latter had to withdraw from 157 cabeceras municipals in 2003, due to widespread 
guerrilla attacks on police stations.168 
H. CONCLUSION 
It should be clear from this chapter that drug-related police corruption within the 
Colombian police has always been distinct from police corruption in Mexico.  In 
Colombia, drug-related police corruption has primarily been an individual or small group 
problem, except for certain instances, such as when a large portions of the CNP in 
Medellin was controlled by Pablo Escobar.  However it remains unclear just how much 
of the Medellin police force was actually on the take.  Based on the testimony given by 
an anonymous CNP officer, mentioned earlier in this chapter, one can assume that there 
were still a relatively large number of honest cops in Medellin.  The murder of literally 
thousands of CNP officers on Escobar’s orders combined with attacks on the police by 
urban guerrillas led the CNP to effectively declare war on the Medellin Cartel and 
collaborate with the paramilitary organization, Los PEPES, with links to the Cali Cartel.  
Both the CNP and Los PEPES sought to engage Escobar on his own terms, which was 
nothing less than a fight to the death, which ended with the literal death of Escobar and 
the figurative death of the Medellin Cartel.  In the process, the CNP was increasingly 
militarized and increasingly indiscriminate in its pursuit of its goal, developments which 
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led to a dramatic increase in human rights violations by the CNP.  However, despite, or 
because of its recent history as a major violator of human rights, the CNP has now been 
transformed into a model police force.  It is now regarded as one of the most efficient and 
least corrupt anti-narcotics police forces in the world.  As the next chapter will show, 
many of the CNP’s organizational strengths derive from its centralized force structure 
and a significant increase in resources devoted to the CNP during the reformation of the 
organization after the Medellin and the Cali Cartels had been destroyed in the mid-1990s. 
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IV. EXPLAINING POLICE CORRUPTION 
A INTRODUCTION 
As demonstrated in the previous two chapters, drug-related police corruption in 
Colombia and Mexico have very different, country-specific, histories and equally distinct 
contemporary configurations.  The first part of this chapter outlines the organizational 
factors that explain why present day, Mexico and Colombia are at the opposite ends of 
the spectrum in terms of levels of police corruption generally and drug related corruption 
specifically.  As we have seen, at the present time, the Colombian National Police (CNP) 
are considered to be one of the most efficient anti-narcotic policing institutions in all of 
Latin America.169 In the case of Mexico, meanwhile, the police once upon a time 
exploited drug-traffickers, the former are now the ones being exploited by drug-
traffickers.  In many areas in fact some branches of the police have effectively been 
completely co-opted by, or domesticated to, the large drug cartels, at the same time as 
they continue their pervasive exploitation of average citizen through the mordida. 
Conventional organizational factors clearly help explain many of the weaknesses of the 
Mexican police, while also explaining the strengths of the CNP.  At the same time, the 
country specific factors that have already been outlined in the respective chapters above 
on Colombia and Mexican will be revisited in a directly comparative approach.  This will 
carry us beyond the conventional organizational explanations for different levels of 
police corruption in Colombia and Mexico to provide a deeper country-specific 
understanding, which encompasses history, political economy and social and cultural 
dynamics, to explain why contemporary Mexico and Colombia are at completely 
opposite ends of the spectrum in relation to levels of drug-related police corruption. 
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B. POLICE SUBCULTURE AND THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL NEXUS 
(PCN) 
Police corruption in Mexico is just one of the many problems that is best 
understood as the result of hundreds of years during which the political system, the social 
order and the economy, has gone through many changes but continues to be permeated 
by an elaborate network of patron-client relations.170  At the level of government this 
provided the context in which criminality flourished.  In fact, in most cases the police 
themselves were, and often still are, the criminals.  Police impunity came of age during 
the presidential-dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910).  Under Diaz the police were 
empowered by the state to act above the law in order to maintain and consolidate power 
in a political context where democracy only existed in name and civil unrest in many 
parts of Mexico constantly threatened those in power.  Police corruption and later drug-
related police corruption intensified under the authoritarian and centralized government 
of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) from the 1930s to 2000. Furthermore, 
because of a weak judicial system, the police had an extra incentive to resolve problems 
at the street level using coercion and/or the extraction of bribes.171  This has meant that 
over generations the vast majority of Mexican citizens have come to accept corruption in 
both government and the police as a normal part of every-day life.172 
In Colombia, meanwhile, police culture and everyday practice was forged under a 
very different set of historical circumstances.  Colombia is Latin America’s oldest 
“democracy” (since 1861) apart from a short period of military dictatorship. The 
country’s political system has been dominated by two major political parties: the Liberals 
and the Conservatives.  Thus, Colombia has a fairly strong, albeit narrow, democratic 
system with the two main parties alternating their control over the executive branch of 
government, and jockeying for power in the legislature.  Because one political party did 
not have a monopoly on power, Colombian politicians were never able to penetrate the 
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state to the degree that the PRI did in Mexico and establish a system for the extraction of 
kickbacks from drug traffickers specifically and criminal networks generally.173 
Furthermore, it is logical to assume that the police share views similar to the population 
from which the officers themselves are recruited. An individual’s propensity to break the 
law before becoming a police officer flows from broader societal factors that shape the 
views of the individual police recruit or officer.  Both the country-specific-historical 
factors, the more specific social and cultural differences between Mexico and Colombia, 
have over time set the parameters for the formation and transformation of police culture. 
As this chapter will make clear, this provides the backdrop for the more conventional 
organizational factors that are deployed to explain and address both police corruption and 
drug-related police corruption.  The conventional organization factors that are the focus 
of research and reform include, as already noted; recruitment and selection, training and 
promotion, and, most importantly salary levels and the quality of equipment and 
resources. 
C ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA 
1. The Police Recruitment Process in Mexico 
The recruitment process may be one of the most important pieces of the puzzle 
when trying to find the root causes of police corruption.  Research has shown that 
individuals that have violated the law before becoming police officers are more likely to 
commit acts of corruption once they have been recruited into the force.174  It has also 
been established that that there is a clear trend on the part of police officers to move from 
minor to more serious acts of corruption and criminality over time.  Once the police 
officers concerned have crossed the line as it were, they can be expected to continue to do 
so and to do so in ever more substantive ways.  This may explain why a vast number of 
Mexican police officers move from the extraction of bribes in day-to-day street 
operations to working with the drug cartels.  For example, prior to the dismantling of the 
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PJF and its replacement by the AFI, it has been made clear that many officers who had 
joined the PJF did so because they were predisposed to the abuse of their power to enrich 
themselves illegally.175  The new recruits to the PJF were from the outset willingly, even 
enthusiastically embraced the corrupt structure of the organization.176  Unfortunately, in 
Mexico it was certainly the case in the past, and is still the case in many instances that 
those already engaged in police corruption enroll novice recruits into the process 
immediately upon their entry into the force.  In fact this process often starts before the 
recruits have even finished being trained. 
In September of 2006, Sigrid Artz, the national security advisor to the newly 
installed administration of president Felipe Calderon, informed senior Mexican 
government officials that the a more professional police force could only be created by 
paying higher salaries and using a more standardized system of recruitment.177  Mexico’s 
lack of automated databases and in some cases no records or incomplete police personnel 
files has created a situation where a police officer dismissed for police corruption can 
simply re-locate to a different region and rejoin the police force.  Even worse, it appears 
that prior to the appointment of Attorney General Lozano in 1997 the federal police were 
acquiring new recruits who had been selected by, and then sent to the police academies 
by, the country’s major organized crime organizations.178  The majority of Mexican 
police officers have at best only completed elementary school.179  Meanwhile, based on 
article 14 of Mexico’s public security reform act of 1999, the minimum educational 
requirement for joining the country’s elite federal police is a high school diploma.180 
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2. The Police Recruitment Process in Colombia 
In contrast to Mexico, the CNP has recognized the importance of screening 
recruits prior to their admission to the police academies.  This is the first of many factors 
that explain much lower levels of corruption within the CNP.  In 1998, La Universidad of 
Los Andes developed a psychological and biographical inventory test designed 
exclusively for the CNP in order to weed out candidates who viewed the police force as a 
place where they could engage in corruption under the protection of the CNP uniform.  
Since 1998, using this screening process, the CNP has added about 1,500 new officers 
per year to its ranks.  This screening process has not only decreased the level of police 
officers dismissed for acts of corruption, but it has also decreased the number of recruits 
who fail to make it through the training process once they are enrolled at one of the 
police academies.  Thus, there is a clear trend that increasingly ensures that from the 
outset it can be assumed that the majority of officers will be capable of fulfilling their 
mandated police roles and tasks.181  Furthermore, every individual entering the CNP 
training academies possesses at least a high school degree and CNP commissioned 
officers possess a bachelor degree from the CNP’s service academy.  The latter is 
equivalent to the Colombian Armed Forces service academies (Naval, Army and Air 
force).182  Approximately 20 percent of the CNP are auxiliary police officers and even 
the great majority of them have at least high school diplomas and the few that do not are 
fulfilling their mandatory military service requirement within the CNP instead of in the 
army.183  As was made clear in chapters two and three, Colombia’s more stringent police 
recruitment process is one of the major factors in the past decade that has helped to make 
the CNP one of the least corrupt police forces in Latin America.184  Research has shown 
that that there are far few complaints about more educated police officers abusing their 
                                                 
181 Urueña, Police Corruption in Colombia, 579.  
182 "Comparative Criminology – South America – Colombia," University of San Diego, http://www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/samerica/colombia.html (accessed April 27, 2008). "Colombia – National 
Police (Policia Nacional)," Global Security, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/colombia/colombia_police.htm (accessed April  2008).  
183 Llorente, Demilitarization in a War Zone, 115.  
184 Valentine, et al., Reducing Incentives for Corruption in the Mexico City Police Force, 19.  
 80
authority.  Clearly, the lack of adequate education in the case of the majority of the 
Mexican police forces means they are unprepared from the outset to deal with the 
discretionary power they possess as uniformed representatives of the state.185  
3 Police Salaries, Resources, Promotion and Training in Mexico 
Excessively low salaries and no bullets for their side arms are common problems 
for the vast majority of Mexico’s police forces.  In Tijuana, one of Mexico’s most violent 
cities, as well as many other regions in Mexico, the police are often required to purchase 
their basic equipment, such as bullets, firearms, uniforms and bulletproof vests.  To 
further highlight this problem, there have been instances where, U.S. Custom Officials 
have caught Mexican police officers attempting to cross back into Mexico after having 
visited the local Wal-Mart in U.S. border cities to purchase ammunition.186  This is just 
one more organizational problem that motivates Mexican police officers to seek out and 
supplement their incomes though acts of police corruption. However, instead of 
addressing the corruption problem, particularly drug-related  police corruption as a 
problem to do with salaries and resources, when he came to power in 1994 President 
Ernesto Zedillo opted to increase the military’s role in domestic security and President 
Vicente Fox (2000-2006) only intensified this strategy. 
In fact, they did what every Mexican President since Miguel de la Madrid (1982-
1988) had done.  In an effort to provide a quick fix for a deeply rooted and worsening 
problem within the police force, they have increasingly inserted the military into 
domestic security matters.  However, military involvement has not eased Mexico’s 
domestic security problems concerning drug traffickers and police corruption.  If 
anything, it has exacerbated police corruption by allowing the state to continue to ignore 
the real issue: the institutionalized incompetence, corruption and open criminality of the 
great majority of police officers throughout Mexico.  This trend is demonstrated by 
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Figure 17 below, in which the military’s budget grew between 1996 and 2003, while the 
federal police budget grew minimally over the same period.  Furthermore, by 2003, there 
were 18,000 PGR employees but only 10 percent were actual police officers; 86 percent 
occupied administrative positions, while the remaining 4 percent were public 
prosecutors.187 Meanwhile, state and municipal governments are responsible for the 
allocation of funds for their police forces.  Due to the difficulty of attempting to gather 
data for thirty-one states and over 2,400 municipalities, this thesis was not able to obtain 
substantial budget information about Mexican state and municipal police departments.  
However, it is safe to assume based on the situation on the ground in most states and 
municipalities that the police force is seriously under-paid and under funded at all levels. 
Figure 17 below covers Mexico’s national civilian law enforcement budget in 
comparison to the army and military from 1996 to 2003. It is safe to assume that the 
situation was probably even worse in previous decades because, as was made clear in 
chapter two, in earlier years there were no provisions made at all for a budget for the 
federal police. 
 Civilian Law 
Enforcement 









1996 1.7 10.0 3.4 
1997 2.5 12.1 4.4 
1998 3.5 14.2 5.9 
1999 4.0 17.0 6.7 
2000 4.9 20.5 8.0 
2001 5.6 22.4 8.9 
2002 7.0 22.7 8.5 
2003 7.2 23.0 8.9 
Figure 17.   Diario Oficial de la Federación--Amounts are in billions of Mexican peso.  
(Artz, 2001)  
. 
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The average salary for Mexican police officers, as of July 2007 was 
approximately USD$ 375 a month.  This is well below the USD$ 660 that the Mexican 
government says is the bare minimum required to feed a family and cover basic needs.188 
In 2005, police salaries were even lower in Mexico’s border cities at around USD$ 300 a 
month, while a patrol officer operating in Mexico’s federal district only earned about 
USD$ 500 a month.  Table 5 below provides a comparison of the average salary in 
Mexico’s federal district in February 2005.  The exchange rate at the time was 
USD$1=MXP$11.16. 
 
Police Manufacturing Maquiladoras Construction Services 
$13.45 $35.77 $23.33 $15.27 $22.09 
Table 5.   Daily Income by Sector (average daily wage in 2005 was USD$ 4.05). 
(Cornelius 2005). 
 Police salaries are still substandard at all three levels of policing.  For example in 
2007 an honest policeman in Tijuana resigned after watching his boss turn a blind eye to 
drug smuggling for a bribe of USD$ 5000 given to him by members of the Tijuana 
Cartel.  During the same year in Monterey, Mexico’s richest city, the state government 
arrested 141 state police officers for working with the Gulf Cartel.189  For more such 
examples refer back to chapter two.  Also inadequate salaries and low educational 
attainment go far in explaining the lack of leadership within the majority of the state and 
municipal police forces throughout Mexico.  Senior municipal and state law enforcement 
officials still pass around la copa (tin cup) to collect their share of the bribes that 
subordinates have received.  However, this system is different today insofar as it is much 
more of a closed loop.  During the 1980s, money and gifts would flow from the 
municipal level all the way through the federal level of policing until they reached 
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important people at the top of the PRI.  In present day Mexico, the federal police are not 
showing up in PGR airplanes to make collections, today this money remains in the hands 
of local police officials and state and municipal government officials.  Thus, the top-
down system of police exploitation has been transformed at the municipal and state level 
of policing only insofar the dividends of corruption no longer flow up to the top, nor does 
the top end of the system have the power to make it so.  Today the corruption exists in a 
more fragmented fashion to supplement the fact that the police forces in Mexico are 
characterized by an extremely large base of poorly paid officers at the bottom, with a few 
better paid individuals at the top.190  Because of the low wages at the bottom, mordidas, 
or bites, allow police officers to augment their salaries and avoid processing citizens for 
minor infractions.191  Furthermore, this system and the passing around of la copa fosters 
a situation where low ranking officers throughout Mexico feel intense pressure from 
senior departmental leadership to buy into the patron client promotion system.  As on 
observer has made clear, for a police officer “to ascend the ladder,” he, or she, “will have 
to resort to the mordida.”  If they fail to do so, they “will be forced to remain at the 
bottom of the departmental command structure and remain content with low wages or 
leave the force all together.”192 
Another very important factor in Mexico is the amount and quality of training 
received by the average Mexican police officer.  In 2007, Mexico’s Public Security 
Minister, Genaro Garcia Luna announced that the federal government was attempting to 
initiate an ambitious program for a national police academy that would retrain Mexico’s 
400,000 police.  More than anything else, this public statement indicates that prior to 
2007, the vast majority of Mexico’s police forces had received little or no formal training 
prior to putting on their uniforms.  At last count, Mexico had fifty-eight academies 
designed specifically for Mexico’s preventative police force; of these 58, 23 had opened 
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their doors in the last twenty years.  Basic training is four and a half months except for 
Mexico City where officers to posted to the capital receive six months of training. 
Criminologists argue that more educated individuals do better in police training 
and retain the vital knowledge necessary for police work, which requires clear thinkers 
that can solve dynamic social situations that require both initiative and discretion.193  
When the Secretariado Nacional de Seguridad Publica (SNSP) conducted a test that 
sought to gauge the training and experience of the Mexican police force, the results 
revealed that out of 130,000 police officers surveyed, the average score was 71.79% with 
more than 12,000 failures.  The survey also revealed that the police were extremely 
incompetent in basic law enforcement duties and tactics.  The great majority of police 
surveyed did not possess even a basic knowledge of the operation of the criminal justice 
system.194  It was argued that these poor results flowed from low levels of education, 
which meant that during their training, prior to becoming police officers, left a limited 
impact on them. This is part of the wider and steady erosion of a law enforcement system 
in crisis.  The great majority Mexican police departments lack the necessary tools 
required to evaluate incoming recruits establish guidelines for performance and more 
importantly databases that would allow them to successfully weed out and track officers 
dismissed for acts of corruption.195  Because of these organizational problems, it is not 
surprising that, La Organización Transparencia Mexicana reported that there were 197 
million acts of corruption reported by Mexican citizens for the year of 2007.196 
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4 Police Salaries, Resources, Promotion and Training in Colombia 
In the wake of the security crisis in the early1990s, outlined in detail in an earlier 
chapter, the Pastrana administration (1998-2002) increased the Colombian defense 
budget to 3.6 percent of Colombia’s total GDP.  This produced quick results in terms of 
modernizing and professionalizing both the military and police forces.197  President 
Alvaro Uribe (2002 to present) “hit the deck plates running” in order to broaden the 
policies of his predecessor, further strengthening the armed forces and police.  He 
restored the police presence in every municipality throughout the country, including all 
regions where the police had earlier been forced to leave by guerrillas.198 While Uribe 
has been in office, the defense budget has continued to grow.  At last report in 2006, it 
was estimated to be about USD$ 6.9 billon, Uribe also took a bold approach by imposing 
a special tax on wealthy Colombians and/or their businesses.  This has allowed him to 
expand the CNP from 110,000 to 170,000 officers and increase their salaries as well.  In 
addition to the effort made by Pastrana and Uribe, Colombia has also been benefiting 
from U.S. Assistance of approximately USD$ 1.6 billion a year.  During the early 1990s, 
the average police officer in Colombia only earned about USD$ 190 a month.199  Today, 
by contrast, he or she earns about USD$ 700 a month.200  This is more than three times 
the official minimum wage in Colombia of USD$ 220 a month.201  One police officer 
stated that prior to salary increases; he had to go ten years without vacations in order to 
take care of his family.  He also noted that in the 1990s, outlaw groups would rob 
financial centers throughout Medellin and these financial centers would contract off duty 
CNP officers for the purpose of providing security.  He stated that a patrol officer could 
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make double his police salary in one month by moonlighting as a security guard.202  
However not all CNP supplemented their salaries in such relatively “legitimate” ways. 
The low salaries of the early 1990s made extortion and bribes attractive for some CNP 
officers. 203 
According to CNP Colonel Jorge, Gutierrez, Special Advisor for the CNP to the 
United States at the Colombian Embassy in Washington D.C., the alleviation of the 
problem of inadequate salaries was crucial to the creation of an internationally recognized 
professional police force.  Via personal correspondence, he told the author that the CNP 
is now dedicated to ensuring that police officers are provided with competitive salaries.  
Officers of all ranks receive extra allowances for being married or having dependants and 
receive special incentive pay based on types of duty.204  The table below is an 
approximation based on a single officer with less than one year of in pay grade.  This 
table only accounts for base pay and does not take into account cost of living, dependent 














$ 700 $850 $900 $1200 $2050 
Figure 18.   Average Salary for CNP officers of various ranks.  Amounts are in $USD. 
Minimum wage for 2007 was set at USD $220 by Colombian Government.  
(From Gutiérrez, 2008) 
Crucially, and unlike Mexico’s decentralized police force where state and 
municipal police depend on the municipal and state level of government for resources, 
the CNP is centralized and receives resources from the Colombian defense budget, not to 
mention a large portion of funds provided by Plan Colombia.  Furthermore, unlike 
Mexico, the Colombian police receive training assistance from the United States. 
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Prior to discussing the resources and training provided by the U.S., it is important 
to briefly discuss the Colombian National Police’s training and education process along 
with its system of promotion. Colombia has recognized that selection and training are 
both vital factors in the prevention of police corruption.  As already mentioned, 80 
percent of all officers (non-commissioned), attend a minimum six months of formal law 
enforcement training at one of Colombia’s various training academies and all possess at 
least a high-school degree before entering the academy.205.  Those individuals selected to 
become commissioned officers, all attend the, Escuela de Cadetes General Francisco de 
Paula Santander, located in Bogota, which is a formally accredited university under the 
auspices of the Ministerio de Educación Nacional de Colombia.  Cadets who successfully 
complete seven intense semesters of formal academic and police training graduate with a 
bachelor’s degree in Political Administration.  The other track that is offered to aspiring 
commissioned officers, who already have a bachelor’s degree from another Colombian 
University, is two semesters of police training at the Escuela de Cadetes General 
Francisco de Paula Santander.  As commissioned officer becomes more senior he or she 
will normally return to the academy for a masters degree especially tailored to policing. 
Finally, select individuals can also go on to receive even more technical training. When 
this is successfully completed they join the force and are placed at various technical 
positions at the executive level of the CNP.206 
Most police training academies tend to place an emphasis on training in 
operational, judicial and police theory and provide far less instruction in ethics.  
However, as Nubia Ureña has outlined Colombian police training academies have linked 
ethics to overall training in three specific areas.207 
1: Revised curriculums in training schools and in police advancement 
courses that includes training in ethical and anti-corruption subjects so that 
a balance is accomplished with the more traditional and excessive 
emphasis made on operational subjects. 
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2: The police academies teaching staff must be individuals with 
outstanding moral values and character as should their superior officers 
once they have graduated, 
3: There are also ethics-sensitive training programs for each unit and 
service level, making police aware—and maintaining this awareness—of 
possible judicial, disciplinary and ethical implications that they could face 
should they become involved in corruption or any other deviant 
behavior.208 
In addition to the above corruption control measures taken at the training academy 
level, Serrano’s cultural transformation reforms also increased the level of leadership and 
management, personal training and client service precepts for the National Police.  
Through contracts with various Colombian universities, the senior police leadership 
regularly take business courses, while mid- and lower ranking officers are required to 
frequently to receive updated training at police academies..  Even though the CNP 
receives less training than the army in small unit tactics, it has been reported that the CNP 
is usually better led, which is a direct result of it being better trained, having the proper 
resources and having a closer relationship with the civilian population.209  The CNP also 
provides incentives for rank and file officers to excel at police work by providing them 
with the opportunity to advance to supervisory positions within the sub-official-executive 
level.  After four years as a patrolman and based on merit, they can move to the executive 
level of policing.  However, this ladder of upward mobility for aspiring patrolmen, 
carabineros and criminal investigators who did not begin their career as commissioned 
officers is capped at the level of mid-grade officer.210  Most importantly, and in sharp 
contrast to municipal and state police in Mexico, there was no evidence of a patron-client 
system driving promotion in the CNP. 
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5.  U.S. Military and Police Aid to Mexico and Colombia 
Mexico is considered to be one of the largest recipients of U.S. counter-narcotics 
assistance although it receives significantly less assistance than larger programs in 
Afghanistan and Colombia.  The resources and training provided by the United States – 
and particularly the decision by the Colombian government to accept counter-drug 
assistance for the police and not for the army between 1996 and 1999 – reinforced 
Colombian police reform efforts in a way that did not happen in Mexico. Meanwhile, 
current U.S. counter-narcotics policy towards Mexico focuses on the interdiction and 
eradication of drug shipments, primarily via border security screening efforts along the 
U.S.-Mexican border. Since 2002 border security has accounted for 35 percent of all 
Washington’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance 
to Mexico.211  However, the primary recipients of training and equipment are mainly the 
Mexican Air Force and Navy.  There continues to be a heavy emphasis on training both 
these services in areas of maritime interdiction and aerial spraying efforts.  To a lesser 
degree, the United States also supports a variety of PGR counter drugs programs. 
However the PGR only sees a small fraction of this money, which goes towards its 
helicopter fleet for aerial crop eradication and interdiction efforts.  An even smaller 
amount is provided for the training of federal law enforcement officials.  This means 
hardly any if none of this assistance goes to state and municipal police departments.  
Unlike Colombia, the Mexican municipal and state police must rely completely on local 
government for departmental resources. 
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Figure 19 shows the amount the U.S. allocated for military and police assistance 
to Mexico over the last eleven or so years. 
 
 
Figure 19.   U.S Military and Police Aid to Mexico—all millions are in U.S dollars. 
(From WOLA, 2006). 
 
Unlike Mexico, Colombia was willing to accept not just monetary aid from 
Washington, but also American military and law enforcement advisors.  The CNP began 
receiving specialized training and equipment during the period when it was trying to 
bring down the Medellin and later the Cali Cartel.  Furthermore, from 1989 to 1999, the 
CNP also received U.S. aid in the form of training, equipment and the expansion of its 
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counter-narcotic forces and air brigades.212  It is also argued that U.S. assistance 




Figure 20.   US Military and Police Aid to Colombia in millions (From WOLA, 2006)  
In 1999, meanwhile, there was a shift in the direction of U.S. assistance from the 
police to the military in order to assist the army with its counter-insurgency operations.  
The Army, Navy and Air force now receive by far the largest portion of monetary 
assistance, but the CNP still receives a considerable amount of money earmarked for 
counter-drug operations.214 
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D. COLOMBIA’S SUCCESS AND MEXICO’S FAILURE AT REFORMING 
THE POLICE 
Mexico has a long history of trying to reform the various levels of the police via 
military interjection into domestic security. Rather than solving the problem, successive 
governments have avoided organizational deficiencies that cannot be resolved by 
shuffling personnel, partial purges of corrupt officers, and creating new organizations or 
re-naming existing forces of a large and highly decentralized law enforcement system.  
As has been made clear the problem include inadequate salaries, a lack of departmental 
resources, substandard recruitment processes, little or no training before and after being 
hired as a police officers, and poor oversight. 
Colombia by contrast attacked the organizational deficiencies directly in the mid-
1990s focusing on the root causes of police corruption, which continue to cripple 
Mexican law enforcement: salaries, recruiting, training and oversight.  Furthermore, US 
support for the CNP during this period led to tangible results in terms of 
professionalization and modernization.  Furthermore, the transformation of police culture 
succeeded in Colombia because the importance of gradual change through education and 
training for the police and a more accessible form of citizen participation in matters of 
domestic security was seen as crucial. 
E. CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED POLICE SYSTEMS 
While administrative changes helped reduced Colombian police corruption over 
time and also account for some of the differences in the levels of police corruption 
between Mexico and Colombia, they do not explain the endemic level of drug-related and 
every-day police corruption in Mexico.  To understand this, it is necessary to examine the 
force structures of the police in the two countries.  Police forces worldwide can be 
divided into three distinct models: decentralized, centralized and integrated.  This thesis 
generally, and the remainder of this chapter more specifically, covers the first two 
models.  Mexico is a classic example of the decentralized model, while Colombia is 
exemplary of the centralized model.  Neither country has an integrated system of law 
enforcement.  A decentralized system of policing is easily recognized by its numerous 
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autonomous agencies, while a centralized system of policing is effectively one 
organization, under the direct control of the national government.215 
Mexico exemplifies the decentralized model better than most countries and stands 
out because of its confusing and inefficient organization and ineffective use of 
personnel.216  Mexico consists of a large federation of 31 states and a Federal District and 
maintains a very complex and decentralized police force.217  Structural and jurisdictional 
functions are also a useful way in terms of understanding how the police operate.  First 
the legal structure is like that of other large federations in the region, (such as Brazil and 
Argentina) allows for a high degree of autonomy between the federal, state and municipal 
level of policing.  Second, the forces are divided into either investigative (or judicial) 
police and patrol (order) police departments.218  There is no particular dominant police 
force in Mexico.  The current organizational hierarchy is extremely complex and 
organizational changes are made frequently by governmental officials attempting to 
reform the system.  The actual size of Mexico’s police forces is about 400,000 officers, 
while there are about 3000 different departments at the municipal, state and federal 
levels.  This means that there is about one police officer for every 295 citizens based of 
an overall Mexican population of 104,000,000.219 Mexico demonstrates that the sheer 
number of police officers has no relationship to effective policing and crime prevention. 
The fact that Mexico has no definitive over-arching police agency, coupled with 
jurisdictional issues places huge limitations on the policing system as a whole.220  The 
federal level has several major law enforcement organizations, with national jurisdiction 
(fuero federal—federal jurisdiction) for serious offenses such as drug trafficking and 
other forms of organized crime.  In 2007 there were approximately 8,000 AFI agents221 
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and 20,000 PFP officers (see Figure 21).222  The figure below illustrates the complexities 
of the decentralized policing system in Mexico.  The next four figures were constructed 
based on information provided by Reames and with the assistance of an anonymous 
Mexican government official. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Federal police and current chain of command.  (From Reames and 
Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007). 
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The Federal District, centered on Mexico City, meanwhile, is unique because it is 
responsible for maintaining its own autonomous force of preventive and judicial police: 
the judicial police (PJDF). The PJDF consists of approximately 3,500 agents and falls 
under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of the Federal district (PGJDF), which is 
similar to a U.S. State Attorney (see Figure 22).  In addition to its own Judicial Police 
force, the preventive police force in the Federal District (Distrito Federal—DF) is much 
larger than any other metropolitan area of responsibility. Greater Mexico City is home to 
25 to 30 million people, and is listed as the ninth largest city in the world.  The police, 
PFP in the Federal District are divided geographically and distributed into precincts 
(delegaciones). Best estimate puts the PFP (DF) at approximately 34,000 officers.  
However, there are also about 40,000 auxiliary police and 15,000 bank police.223 
 
 
Figure 22.   Mexico City (DF) Federal police and current chain of command.  (From 
Reames and Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007). 
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The state level of law enforcement is similar to the Federal District.  The state 
preventive police number about 90,000 members throughout Mexico.  The state level 
police are charged with enforcing what is referred to as (fuero común) which is best 
translated as local law.  The state preventative police fall under the direct authority of the 
(SSP) at the state level.  Within the state, there is another body of judicial police that has 
investigative authority but only at the state level and fall under the direction of the State 
Office of the Attorney General (see Figure 23).224 
 
 
Figure 23.   State Police and current chain of command.  (From Reames and 
Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007). 
Finally, municipal law enforcement represents the largest number of police 
officers, and is completely preventative in nature (see Figure 24).  The municipal 
government can be compared to a county government in the United States.  Mexico is 
comprised of 2,400 municipalities.  There are significant differences across the country in 
terms of manpower, with 335 municipalities (12 percent of the total) having no police 
presence at all.  Roughly 2000 of them have fewer than 100 officers and a very basic 
organizational structure.  However in larger municipalities, police departments are much 
more organizationally complex.  Eighty-seven of the largest municipalities account for 68 
percent of all municipal level police officers in the country as a whole.  This Byzantine 
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system of law enforcement makes clear that the system itself contributes to, rather than 
prevents, high levels of drug-related police corruption. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Municipal Police and current chain of command.  (From Reames and 
Anonymous Mexican Government Official, 2007). 
 
On the other hand, the CNP exemplifies the centralized form of policing, with one 
chain of command and strong vertical administrative linkages and lines of 
communication throughout the overall organization.  The CNP is essentially a military 
corp. tightly bound to the Ministry of Defense.  The Colombian National Police have 
grown in a sustained manner in the 1960s and today is comprised of approximately 
170,000 officers.225  The CNP’s hierarchical structure is very similar to the Colombian 
Armed Forces.  The CNP has three career paths. First: high ranking officers ranging from 
lieutenants to generals; second: sub-officials (mid-grade officers, including sergeants and 
corporals); third rank and file officers or patrolmen who are equivalent to army 
privates.226  Within this pyramidal structure, 4 percent are high-ranking officers, 20 
percent are mid-grade and senior enlisted officers and the remaining 76 percent are rank 
and file officers.  Unlike a decentralized system of policing a centralized system does not 
suffer from jurisdictional problems, which is a key weakness in Mexico.  However, as 
already mentioned the CNP is divided into urban and rural forces.  Each group receives 
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separate and specialized training in order to function properly in distinct security 
contexts.  The CNP rural force is charged with ensuring law and order in rural 
municipalities and is also secondary to the army in regards to Colombia’s struggle with 
leftist guerillas.227  In the cities, where the majority of the police force is based, 80 
percent are uniformed officers performing various tasks ranging from patrolling, 
responding to calls from the public and enforcing national, departmental and municipal 
statutes.  They are also engaged in guarding highways and power infrastructures such as 
power plants and oil pipelines.  The CNP are also responsible for personnel protection 
details for senior Colombian government officials.228 
 
 
Figure 25.   Colombian National Police and current chain of command. (From Policía 
Nacional De Colombia Official Government Website). 
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As already mentioned, the Colombian National Police has measures embedded 
within its system to ensure civilian control over its police force.  The existence of a 
centralized police force with obvious military characteristics, is no more a threat to 
democracy in Colombia today than a decentralized or integrated policing system is in 
those countries where the latter or the former is in use.  The Colombian model is widely 
viewed as having produced an effective police force.  It too has the potential for 
corruption but not to the same extent or in the same form as a decentralized system of 
policing.  Typically, with a centralized system, when corruption occurs, it occurs at the 
more senior levels of the chain of command instead of the mid and lower levels of the 
system.229 
F. CARTEL SIZE AND IDEOLOGY 
During the 1980s through the mid-1990s, the Medellin cartel’s “ideology” was 
articulated by men whose formative years were profoundly shaped by life on the streets 
of Medellin.  As one author has observed they were survivors, “habituated to violence 
who, at times, resembled more closely a pack of mad dogs than leaders of a multi-billion 
dollar-cocaine enterprise.”230  Pablo Escobar’s frontal attack on the state in general and 
the CNP in particular goes is central to understanding why drug-related police corruption 
remained relatively low throughout Colombia, with the exception of corruption of the 
CNP command in Medellin, when Escobar was at the apex of his power. 
Unlike the Medellin Cartel, the Cali cartel was, from the outset low key and 
business like criminal enterprise that depended on corruption and avoided violence if 
possible.  The latter form of ideology and command structure is exhibited by the four 
main Mexican cartels (Tijuana, Gulfo, Juarez and Sinaloa—also referred to as the 
Mexican Federation).231  As already discussed in Chapter II, this greatly explains why 
drug-related police corruption in Mexico is multi-directional, focused mainly at 
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municipal, state and mid-level police officials.  Today’s Mexican cartels, just as the Cali 
Cartel before it, understands that Escobar-style “narco-terrorism”  is an approach that can 
ultimately be defeated, primarily because it pushes the state to ratchet up its commitment 
to bringing down the cartel or cartel concerned.  In the case of the demise of the Medellin 
Cartel for example, it sowed the seeds of its own destruction.  It went to war with the 
Colombian state, putting the CNP on a war-like footing, without the former having the 
benefits that allow rural based insurgencies to survive via retreat and maneuver.  For 
completely different reasons, Escobar made the same mistake that the ultra-Peronist 
urban guerillas in Argentina made in the 1970s.  They launched frontal assaults on police 
stations and military barracks creating a situation where they had no real lines of retreat 
and ensuring that the Argentine state would respond via a steady escalation of violence, 
including the attendant plethora of human rights abuses.232 An anonymous Mexican 
special forces officer told the author that as of the present time: 
The greater majority of violence continues to be cartel on cartel despite the 
cartels’s recent attempts to deter federal security forces by assassinating 
several high level PFP officers.  Mexican cartels typically only confront 
security forces using violence when the security forces have initiated the 
confrontation and the cartel concerned has no other option but to respond 
with bloodshed.233 
The main difference between the Mexican cartels and the Cali Cartel was the latter’s 
focus on corrupting important people and organizations in Colombian society in general. 
For the most part the CNP was not their main focus.  This was due to both the particulars 
of their ‘business plan’ and increasingly because of the fact that the Medellin Cartel had 
generated such hatred amongst the ranks of the CNP.  The only major connection the Cali 
Cartel had with the police was the former’s provision of indirect assistance to the CNP in 
the bringing down of the Medellin Cartel.  In addition, in the medium term this approach 
simply cleared the way for the CNP to eliminate the Cali Cartel once they had dealt with 
Pablo Escobar and his organization.  Mexican cartels no longer possess the top cover that 
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they once enjoyed under PRI.  But they have learned that they can continue to operate 
with the same degree of success and in fact their operations continue to grow and they 
continue to become stronger by corrupting large numbers of police officers at the 
municipal, state level and the mid-level of federal law enforcement.  The Mexican 
attorney general estimates that each drug of the four drug cartels makes a net profit of at 
least USD$ 10 billion annually. The stakes are high, and the discretionary funds available 
are substantial. This ensures that the Mexican drug cartels are one of the major 
facilitators of corruption in every branch of Mexican law enforcement.234 
Because there are only four cartels that dominate Mexico nation-wide, profits for 
each of these cartels are extremely large in comparison to three hundred or more 
cartelitos operating in Colombia today.  In the case of Mexico, where one cartel controls 
all aspects of the drug trade within their region, each Colombian cartelito usually manges 
one stage of the overall process.  In Colombia, each cartel specializes in either 
agrochemicals, cultivation of the coca leaf, chemical inputs, sale of coca base, laboratory 
operations, procurement of chemical precursors, the sale, or export of cocaine and the 
operation of clandestine airplane runways.235  The cartelitos make substantial, but far 
from excessive profits and have neither the resources nor the need to engage in a great 
deal of corruption in relation to the government and the police, or the military.  
Furthermore, the Medellin and Cali Cartels were large, urban-based organizations that 
focused on the production and export of cocaine. They purchased large amounts of coca 
leaf from growers in Peru and Bolivia. However, today 80 percent of cocaine being 
produced within Colombia’s borders uses coca leaf grown in the country. This has meant 
that the small drug cartels have shifted the center of their operations increasingly to rural 
areas, making them more elusive and harder to apprehend.  They are more inclined to 
simply hide from the police rather than try and corrupt them, whereas the Mexican 
Cartels main emphasis is on the transportation of drugs to market north of the border. To 
this end the latter have spent decades corrupting the police and relevant officials, while 
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they are large hierarchical organizations centered in, and around the Mexican cities or 
states for which three of the four cartels are named: Tijuana, Juarez and Sinaloa. 
Based on information provided within this chapter, is should be apparent that 
there are no easy answers. If nothing else this chapter has made clear that conventional 
explanations assist in understanding the drastic differences in police corruption.  
However, it is ultimately the country-specific histories, political economics and social 
dynamics that has meant that as of the present day drug-related police corruption is 
Colombia is extremely low.  In Mexico meanwhile, drug-related police corruption is both 
deeply rooted and getting worse, while the approach to the problem by successive 
administrations at the national level for almost thirty years has been like a ship with a 
jammed rudder, cutting circles in the sea. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has argued that the level of police corruption (and more specifically 
drug-related police corruption since the 1970s) has always been much higher in Mexico 
than in Colombia.  Using a comparative analysis it has shown that the Colombian 
authorities are doing a much better job of controlling police corruption, despite the fact 
that the cultivation, production and the initial stage of transportation of 80 percent of the 
world’s supply of cocaine occurs in Colombia.  Meanwhile, the greatest challenge facing 
the Mexican government today and for the foreseeable future is pervasive day-to-day and 
drug-related police corruption.  By understanding the Colombian National Police’s 
successes and the Mexican police’s failures perhaps Mexican policy makers can learn 
from the Colombian model and address the numerous organizational and structural 
deficiencies that foster all forms of police corruption.  Conventional wisdom holds that 
wherever there is drug trafficking there is police corruption and little can be done to 
combat it, however, the Colombian National Police fly in the face of such thinking.  As 
illustrated in chapters two and three, the problem of drug-related police corruption in 
Mexico is deeply rooted, whereas in Colombia drug-related corruption remains confined 
to individual or small groups of police officers. 
B. COMPARING CORRUPTION IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA 
Chapter II illustrated that corruption in all its forms has flourished in Mexico 
throughout its history. For centuries, elaborate systems of patronage dominated every 
aspect of political, social and economic life in Mexico.  In the twentieth century, the 
Partido Revolucionaro Institucional (PRI), via the military and police, successfully 
managed and taxed drug-traffickers and organized crime.  Under this system, top 
government officials provided criminals with impunity and protection for the right to 
operate within a given territory.  The 2000 elections in Mexico ended seventy-one years 
of political hegemony by the PRI. This led to the eventual breakdown of the central 
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control system over drug traffickers.  The PRI was no longer able to provide the type of 
protection and immunity it once did, thus the drug-traffickers began to seek out new 
types of ad hoc coalitions primarily with municipal and state police officials, or with 
relatively isolated federal police officials. Furthermore, as emphasized in Chapter II, this 
did not and does not mean less drug-related corruption, but simply a greater degree of 
unpredictability in the relationships between organized crime and law enforcement 
officials.  The collapse of the corrupt national PRI system of interaction between the 
Mexican cartels and the state, proceeded a few years earlier by the fall of the Medellin 
and Cali Cartels in Colombia, set the scene for the ascendancy of the Mexican cartels in 
their contemporary and particularly powerful form. The Mexican cartels are increasingly 
become quasi-states that focus on the wholesale corruption of sub-state and municipal 
levels of police and government. 
Chapter III argued that the number of police officers on the payroll of the cartels 
in Colombia never reached the same level as in Mexico.  However, based on available 
literature, it does appear that the Medellin Cartel was successful in corrupting relatively 
large numbers of police officers who lived and operated in and around the city of 
Medellin between the early 1980s up to Pablo Escobar’s death in December 1993.  The 
number of CNP officers on the Medellin Cartel’s payroll in this period is unknown.  
However, it can be assumed that because of Escobar’s war against the state in which the 
CNP was one of the main institutions that he targeted the figure remained relatively low.  
In the case of the Colombian National Police, police corruption took the form of human 
rights violations against Colombian citizens, police participation with Los Pepes, a 
paramilitary group led by Fidel Castano and the Cali cartel, all with a unified objective of 
taking down the Medellin Cartel.   
Unlike Mexico, Colombia has historically had a fairly strong, but narrow 
democratic system with alternating control over the executive branch of government.  
This meant that the Colombian government never had the same capacity to exploit drug-
traffickers the way the one-party state in Mexico did.  That is the Colombian government 
and Colombian politicians were never able to extract kickbacks from the drug traffickers 
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to the extent that Mexican officials were able to.236 Meanwhile, as chapters two and three 
make clear Colombia and Mexico are at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of 
fielding an effective anti-narcotics force with the ability to prevent drug-related police 
corruption. Chapter IV laid out all the current strengths and weaknesses, and the domestic 
and international support that each police force receives, clarifying the organizational 
problems that pertain to the Mexican model.  This thesis does not attempt to argue that 
the CNP is corruption free, but it can certainly be argued that levels of police corruption 
are relatively low, not only in comparison to Mexico, but to the rest of Latin America, 
with the exception of Chile.  The organizational factors when linked to country specific 
factors provide a very clear explanation of drug-related police corruption in Colombia, 
and why it has never had the scale or scope that is the case in Mexico.  This thesis also 
provided insights into the CNP’s success in terms of relatively low levels of corruption 
when compared to the rest of Latin America.  The table below sums up all organizational 
and country specific differences, which have shaped the Colombian and the Mexican 
police forces for better or for worse. 
                                                 
236 Perez, El Estado En Crisis, 150-156.  
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Recruiting /Selection Poor Excellent 
Salaries (USD) Poor Excellent 
Training Poor Excellent 
System of Promotion Corrupt Fair 
Internal control Poor Fair 
Police Resources (Domestic) Poor Excellent 
Police Resources  (U.S. 
Allocated) 
= to most Latin American 
countries but considerably less 
than that provided to Colombia 
# 1 recipient of U.S. military and 
police aid in Latin America since 
1999  




Force Structure Decentralized  Centralized 
EXTERNAL FACTORS   
Legacy of  
Political-Criminal Nexus 
Created corrupt police subculture No impact on police subculture 
Cartel Size and Ideology 1. Four large cartels controlling 
large regions. 
2.  Huge monetary resources 
available for corruption purposes 
3.  Corruption aimed at municipal 
state level and isolated mid-level 
federal officials. 
4.  Avoids direct confrontations 
with military and federal police 
when possible. 
1. (1980-1994) Medellin cartel: 
Narco-terrorism against the state 
and its law enforcement 
institutions.  Cali Cartel (Huge 
monetary resources, preferred the 
bribe over violence.  Corruption 
was mostly at the political and 
judicial levels of government.   
2.  (1994 to Present) 300 plus 
carelitos operating independently 
of each other.   
*. Fewer resources available for 
mass corruption of law 
enforcement personnel 
*.Very elusive because of size, 
there less need to corrupt. 
* If confronted by the CNP more 
likely to fight due to the fact that  
smaller cartels don’t have luxury 
of writing off drug ships as losses 
because they only control one 
small piece of the puzzle.  
   
Table 6.   Summary of factors accounting for different levels of drug-related police 
corruption within the Mexican and Colombian Police Forces. 
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As the above table makes clear Colombia is doing extremely well in terms of 
correcting its organizational deficiencies and building a police force that is less likely to 
become involved in drug-related police corruption. Since the early 1980s, Mexico, 
meanwhile, has increasingly sought short-term solutions by deepening military 
involvement in its war on drugs, something that was further strengthened in 2007 by 
transferring Mexico’s eradication program from the PGR to SEDENA (Defense 
Department).  As long as the military is doing what the police should be doing, the much 
needed resources and training will continue to be diverted away from the police, 
perpetuating Mexico’s domestic security problem. 
On a positive note, however, the Calderon administration, which came into office 
in 2006, is making an attempt to professionalize domestic law enforcement through the 
creation of a national criminal database and the re-structuring of the federal level of law 
enforcement under one unified chain of command.  However, Calderon’s ability to carry 
out these changes will depend on his ability to muster political support.  If successful, it 
will represent an important transformation for Mexico’s police forces because it would 
ultimately strengthen police investigation capabilities, ensure more accountability and 
enhance coordination among the different agencies.237  However, even if the government 
brings about this reform its success may be short lived, unless other much needed 
structural reforms such as increased salaries, stricter recruiting criteria and enhanced 
recruit training are not introduced. Mexico has a long road to travel in regards to 
reforming institutional deficiency at all three levels of policing. 
At the same time, although there are lessons to be learned from the Colombian 
experience a dramatic turnaround in the organization and operation of Mexico’s police 
forces will be far more difficult because of the country specific factors outlined in this 
thesis.  It is possible to go so far as to argue that reduction of corruption in the police in 
Colombia was the result of a unique conjuncture. First, the early to mid-1990s saw the 
collapse of the Medellin and Cali cartels and the rise of the cartelitos.  Perversely, the 
CNP has Pablo Escobar to thank for its dramatic transformation, insofar as his ratcheting 
                                                 
237 Meyer, Youngers and Taylor, At A Crossroads: Drug trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State, 
8-12 . 
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up the level of violence against the CNP served to galvanize both the CNP specifically 
and the government more generally and eliminate Escobar and his organization and the 
Cali Cartel shortly thereafter. The cartelitos that emerged in the wake of the passing of 
the Medellin and Cali Cartels were far more numerous and more diffuse and less capable 
of, and less interested in, corrupting the police.  Meanwhile, this period saw the 
emergence to a position of leadership of General Serrano who helped foster Colombian 
reform and facilitated a certain degree of bonding between the police and a growing 
number of Colombian citizens.  At the same time, by the end of the 1990s a strong 
Colombian–U.S. alliance had developed, in which the CNP was the main partner in the 
war on drugs in Colombia. All these changes have dramatically strengthened the 
institutional capacity of the CNP right down to the present.   
Unfortunately for those observers looking for a repetition of this scenario in 
Mexico today, they need to realize that the transformation of the CNP, beginning in the 
early 1990s, is best viewed metaphorically as an astrological event in which all the stars 
were in alignment.  At the present time, there is nothing to suggest that the stars are 
moving into a position of alignment in Mexico as far as the government is concerned.  If 
anything, there is the danger that the current crisis in Mexico as of mid-2008 is more 
likely to represent an opportunity for one or more of the four major cartels. If there is 
going to be another alignment of the stars, the beneficiaries may not necessarily be the 
Mexican government or the Mexican people.  The pressure being put on the cartels at the 
moment is more likely to lead to various realignments and/or even mergers or takeovers. 
There is a lot at stake, and the cartels remain in a strong position to protect their interests; 
one way of doing so would be to strengthen the connections between them.  The current 
crisis in Mexico is more likely to lead to stronger and few cartels, rather than their demise 
and replacement by a large number of small operations as happened in Colombia. The 
latter was the context in which drug-related police corruption was sharply curtailed in 
Colombia.  However, to mix metaphors, this exercise in comparing Colombia and 
Mexico has drawn attention to the fact that it will require a magician, rather than a 
politician, to turn the Mexican manzana (apple) into a Colombian naranja (orange). 
While the latter is freshly washed and ready to eat, the former is rotten to the core. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BOTH POLICING SYSTEMS 
Any attempt to deal with the problem at hand needs to start from the assumption 
that it would be unwise to dismantle the entire police force and try to re-build a new 
force.  If anything, this would only worsen the problem because you would lose too many 
experienced officers. However, at this point, Mexico should consider bringing all three 
levels of policing under the central control of the government, though under the Ministry 
of Interior rather than the Ministry of Defense as in Colombia.  Fifty years ago, 
disorderly departmental and municipal police were placed under the supervision and 
control of the Colombian National Police and no longer depended on municipal and state 
governments to provide salaries, training, resources and leadership.238  As the 
experiences of many European countries show (not to mention Canada), a centralized law 
enforcement system does not necessarily hinder democracy, nor lead to human rights 
violations. Centralization – in conjunction with the necessary administrative reforms – 
would help address the majority of drug-related corruption. As the anonymous source 
interviewed by Carlos Perez stated “every narco wants to own his own state and local 
government.”239  Colombia is not a model as such, and the right set of circumstances 
could threaten what is currently a successful and centralized policing system. 
Nevertheless, a move towards a more centralized police force in Mexico would at least 
represent the first step towards weakening the power of the Mexican cartels and force the 
government to begin to deal with the downward spiral of what is a profoundly 
dysfunctional policing system. 
While this thesis has argued that the CNP is moving in the right direction and can 
even provide a model for Mexico, it is not the intention to hold the CNP up as a model 
devoid of problems.  One possible negative implication for Colombia in the future is that 
President Uribe’s Mano Dura initiative increased the overall size of the force from 
110,000 to approximately 170,000 police officers.  In order to meet this goal, the police 
academy had to reduce training time from one year to six months for professional track 
                                                 
238 Llorente, telephonic interview with Author of Demilitarization in a War Zone, May 6, 2008.  
239 Perez, El Estado En Crisis, 134.  
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rank and file officers.  An increase in the number of police officers may well be a good 
idea, but it would be a serious mistake for the CNP to reduce the quantity and quality of 
training in order to meet a higher demand for police officers.  Mexico is a glaring 
example of a country where a high ratio of police officers to citizens does not translate 
into a high level of public safety and security and low levels of corruption, quite the 
opposite.  Nor should the Colombian government elect to bring in more auxiliary non-
professional police officers.  As indicated by criminologists and as clearly evident in the 
case of Mexico, there is a direct correlation between low levels of education and the 
propensity to commit criminal acts.  As noted earlier this pattern does not disappear 
simply because an individual decides become a police officer.  Therefore, the CNP must 
always maintain a much higher ratio of professional track, high school-educated, career 
oriented police officers in comparison to those auxiliary non-professionals who are 
simply completing their mandatory military obligation by serving in the National Police. 
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